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Preface
This thesis contains three essays in different fields of economics. The first es-
say is about microfinance and inflation in low-income countries. The second
essay examines doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment
of private information. The third essay estimates substitution elasticities for
Swiss manufacturing industries between production factors. The third essay
was conducted for the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) and is written in
collaboration with Lukas Mohler. The first two essays are theoretical contri-
butions, while the third essay is an empirical study. The essays cover research
questions that I am especially interested in. In the following, I give a short
introduction to each topic of my thesis and illustrate the importance of my
research.
Chapter 1 analyses the effects of microfinance and inflation in low-income
countries. The idea behind microfinance is the provision of financial services
on a small scale to households that lack access to regular banks. In low-
income countries, more than three-quarters of the population have no access
to formal financial institutions (World Bank, 2012). The inadequate access
that poor households have to financial services is held to be one of the major
factors responsible for the serious inequalities and the lack of development
that exist in low-income countries. Microfinance is a means for alleviating
these problems, as it plays a prominent role in broadening the poor’s access to
financial services.
The success of microfinance has not gone unnoticed and is considered today
to be an important tool for generating access to finance and reducing poverty.
A large body of theoretical and applied literature exists on microfinance. The-
oretical contributions have closely analyzed the mechanisms utilized in micro-
finance for reducing transaction costs and mitigating the asymmetric informa-
tion problem. Numerous field studies have investigated the extent to which
access to microfinance institutes increases the wealth of poor households. How-
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ever, most empirical studies on microfinance neglect general equilibrium effects,
as well as the monetary policy dimension in developing countries which is often
characterized by high inflation rates. Monetary policy influences not only the
inflation rate, but also the terms and conditions of saving and lending.
Our study is the first to analyze the effects of microfinance and inflation in
a monetary general equilibrium model. To do so, we introduce a moral hazard
problem into a monetary general equilibrium model with credit. Monetary
search models are predestined to investigate this kind of research question,
since they allow agents’ monetary decisions to be explicitly modeled. At the
same time, they are well suited for investigating the effects of different mone-
tary policies at a macroeconomic level, taking general equilibrium effects into
account. Finally, the prevailing challenges and market frictions that poor
households face when applying for loans without possessing collateral can be
introduced into the model.
Chapter 2 deals with the doping problem in sport competitions. From the
1920s onwards, individual sport federations began to restrict the use of doping
substances. About forty years later, in 1966, the first doping tests were in-
troduced in cycling and football. Regular controls were then adopted in most
other professional sports. However, each federation had its own approach to
fight doping, and the collaboration with other federations, governments and
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was not always successful. On-
going doping cases and the Festina scandal during the Tour de France in 1998
provided impetus to improve the anti-doping campaign, and to standardize
and coordinate the work of the relevant stakeholders. As a result of this, the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was founded in 1999.
Today, all major sport federations have adopted the World Anti-Doping
Code.1 Every year the WADA releases a list of prohibited substances and
methods. National agencies regularly conduct doping controls in the affiliated
sport federations. Doping controls are carried out not only during competi-
tions, but also during athletes’ preparation periods and holidays. If an athlete
is tested positive for a substance on the list or has been convicted of another
violation of the anti-doping rules, the athlete is sanctioned and banned from
1See WADA (2009) for an extensive description of the World Anti-Doping Code. Information
about the anti-doping history stems from the WADA homepage: http://www.wada-ama.org.
vcompetition, usually for a period of two years. The objective of the WADA
is to establish a doping-free environment. However, despite regular doping
controls and severe sanctions in the case of detection, doping remains present
in professional sports.
The main challenge of the doping prevention is that athletes’ behavior can-
not be directly observed. Moreover, the detection of violations is difficult and
expensive. Asymmetric information arises at different levels. The existing dop-
ing literature has mainly focused on asymmetric information between athletes
and the regulator about the use of performance-enhancing drugs. However, in-
formational asymmetries between athletes about their actual capabilities are
also relevant to an athlete’s decision to take drugs. Our research question in-
vestigates how heterogeneity and an environment of private information affect
athletes’ doping behavior.
Chapter 3 analyses the substitutability patterns of manufacturing indus-
tries in Switzerland. The first oil price shock in 1973 led to major concerns
about how firms and industries adapt to energy price shocks. A better un-
derstanding of how relative price changes affect the input mix and production
costs of firms was required to estimate the overall impact of a price shock on
GDP and prospective growth rates of the economy. Today, such questions have
become relevant once again. Climate change mitigation policies which aim at
increasing the efficiency of industrial production or promoting renewable ener-
gies, force firms to undertake adjustments in their production processes or to
invest in new technologies. The introduction of carbon taxes will change the
absolute and relative prices of different energy sources. Furthermore, Switzer-
land’s decision to phase out nuclear power will entail major adjustments in
energy provision and consequently affect energy prices as well.
Energy price changes are especially relevant for manufacturing industries.
Production costs of firms with flexible production technologies will only in-
crease marginally with an energy price increase, because they are able to
substitute other production factors. If, on the other hand, the production
technology is rigid, firms have greater problems in adjusting to energy price
increases. In order to measure how industries adjust their use of production
factors due to price changes, substitution elasticities are estimated. The larger
the elasticities are, the higher is the degree of flexibility of the production
vi Preface
technology. Moreover, economic substitution elasticities predict how the input
mix changes due to price shocks.
The empirical literature has shown that the magnitude of elasticities varies
significantly across countries, industries, and over time. Thus, adequate esti-
mates of substitution elasticities are needed to assess the effects of concrete
policy measures. However, no recent sector-specific estimates exist for Switzer-
land. We close this gap and estimate substitution elasticities for Swiss manu-
facturing industries between the production factors capital, labor, energy and
material. Our focus is on how energy price increases affect the input mix
of manufacturing industries and the implications for the production costs of
firms.
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Chapter I
A General Equilibrium Analysis of Inflation
and Microfinance in Developing Countries
Abstract
This paper analyses the welfare effects of microfinance and inflation in de-
veloping countries. Therefore, we introduce a moral hazard problem into a
monetary search model with money and credit. We show how access to basic
financial services affects households’ decisions to borrow, to save and to hold
money balances. The group lending mechanism of the microfinance institution
induces peer monitoring, which in turn enables entrepreneurship. Our main
result is that there exists an inflation threshold beyond which entrepreneurship
collapses. We show that inflation affects the impact of microfinance on social
welfare in a nonlinear way. The positive effect of microfinance is largest for
moderate rates of inflation and drops substantially for inflation rates above
the threshold.
Keywords: Microfinance, Moral Hazard, Group Lending,
Peer Monitoring and Monetary Policy.
JEL Classification: D82, E44, G21, O16.
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1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that better access to finance reduces poverty. Firstly,
credit allows poor households to start small businesses, invest in new produc-
tion machines, buy livestock, or simply to consume. Access to basic financial
services facilitates consumption smoothing, payments for their children’s edu-
cation and wealth accumulation. Secondly, savings accounts pay interest and,
thus, mitigate the negative effects of high inflation rates prevalent in develop-
ing countries. Finally, well functioning financial institutions have a positive
effect on growth (see for instance Levine (2005) for a comprehensive litera-
ture survey on the relationship between finance and growth). However, in
developing countries, the majority of households have no access to financial in-
stitutions. Empirical studies have shown that women, rural populations and,
in particular, poor households are most concerned by this issue. In low income
countries, 76 percent of adults have no account at a formal financial institution
(Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012), while the access rate lies at 89 percent
in high income countries.1 Poor people have difficulty in general in gaining
access to financial services. The World Bank reports that 77 percent of adults
earning less than $2 a day are unbanked (World Bank, 2012). Comparing ac-
cess to finance across countries and regions shows that large differences exist.
To make things worse, inflation rates are on average much higher in developing
countries than in industrialized countries.2
While governments in developing countries are well aware of the benefits
of an efficient financial system, the question naturally arises as to why so little
effort is made towards improving access to financial services. The reason is
that basic banking services are complicated by a number of issues in develop-
ing countries. First, poor households have no valuable belongings, nor wealth
that they could use as collateral for a loan. Second, transaction costs are
especially high for small loans, and enforcement of repayments is difficult in
countries with weak legal institutions. Third, asymmetric information between
lenders and borrowers leads to principal-agent problems which may result in
1The terminology formal financial institutions in Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) includes
banks, credit unions, cooperatives, post offices, and microfinance institutions.
2Easterly and Fischer (2001) analyze the effects of inflation on the poor.
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a dwindling of the already weak credit market. Microfinance–the provision
of financial services on a small scale–has shown that there are ways to over-
come these problems and that lending to the poor is not a one-way street.
By adopting new approaches such as peer-monitoring schemes or the village
banking model, microfinance institutes can overcome the asymmetric informa-
tion problem. These lending mechanisms show high repayment rates without
requesting any collateral (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).
Microfinance started in the late 1970s and has expanded quickly over the
last three decades. The original idea was to give credit to the poor. Over
the last two decades, there has been a paradigm shift from highly subsidized
microfinance institutions with limited outreach to a large-scale and financially
sustainable microfinance industry (Robinson, 2001). Furthermore, since the
early 2000s, many microfinance institutions have broadened their financial ser-
vices and now also offer clients the possibility to open saving accounts (Matin
et al., 2002). A leading example of a microfinance institute is the Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh. The Grameen Bank and its charismatic founder Profes-
sor Muhammad Yunus were rewarded in 2006 with the Nobel peace price in
appreciation of their achievements in poverty reduction and economic develop-
ment in Bangladesh by providing the poor with access to finance. Today, over
2000 microfinance institutions exist all around the world and serve roughly one
billion customers. They are mostly situated in developing countries, but are
also to be found in high income countries.
The success of microfinance has not gone unnoticed and is considered today
as an important tool for generating access to finance and reducing poverty. A
large body of theoretical and applied literature exists on microfinance. Theo-
retical contributions have thoroughly analyzed the mechanism utilized in mi-
crofinance to reduce transaction costs and to mitigate the asymmetric informa-
tion problem.3 Numerous field studies have investigated to what extent access
3Stiglitz (1990) pioneered the work on group lending. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) provide an
extensive analysis of group lending extend the model to study four different agency problems
and also discuss practical issues. Armendáriz (1999) analyses the problem of ex-post moral
hazard.
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to microfinance institutes increases the wealth of poor households.4 However,
most empirical studies that have analyzed the impact of microfinance neglect
the monetary policy dimension in developing countries which is often charac-
terized by high inflation rates. Moreover, general equilibrium effects on prices,
caused by the financial intermediation of microfinance institutions, are often
neglected.5 In this paper, we intend to fill this gap by analyzing the effects of
inflation on microfinance in a general equilibrium model. Using a model where
money and credit are essential, allows us to derive the total welfare of an
economy depending on the government’s respective monetary policy and the
outreach and efficiency of its microfinance institutes. Monetary policy plays
an important role, as it directly determines the inflation rate and indirectly
determines the market rates of borrowing and lending. Therefore, we use a
monetary search model similar to Berentsen et al. (2007) to study the welfare
effects of establishing a large-scale and sustainable microfinance institution in
developing countries. To represent the agency problem between borrower and
lender, we introduce a moral hazard problem in the style of Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997). Moreover, we analyze the welfare implications for individual
households.
We show that establishing sustainable microfinance institutions in develop-
ing countries allows poor households to increase their standards of living above
the subsistence level. The reason is that former credit-constrained households
are afterwards able to take out consumer loans or to invest in small busi-
nesses. Moreover, we show that the actual magnitude of the welfare impact of
microfinance crucially depends on the prevailing monetary policy regime.
Our model discloses the relationship between the lending terms of microfi-
nance and the monetary policy of the government. Higher money growth rates
increase inflation and this in turn affects deposit and lending terms of the mi-
crofinance institution: On the one hand, depositors have to be compensated
by a higher interest rate to encourage saving. The higher refinancing costs of
4Two studies of particular interest are Kaboski and Townsend (2012) and Banerjee and Duflo
(2010). The first study evaluates the impact of the Million Baht Village Fund program in
Thailand, and the second study runs a random field experiment, conducted in collaboration
with an Indian microfinance institution.
5An exception is the paper by Kaboski and Townsend (2011), they develop a structural model
to evaluate the impact of large-scale microcredit policy interventions.
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the microfinance institution lead, in turn, to an increase in the lending rate.
Moreover, higher inflation rates decrease real prices and output, which reduce
the gains from trade (real balance effect). Entrepreneurs, who rely on external
funding, are more affected by inflation than subsistence producers. Above a
specific inflation threshold, entrepreneurship collapses and is displaced by sub-
sistence production. Our numerical example shows that the positive impact
of microfinance on social welfare is largest for moderate inflation rates, where
entrepreneurship exists. However, for inflation rates above the threshold, the
positive impact of microfinance drops substantially.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 introduces the agents and
describes the framework of the general equilibrium model with moral hazard
and group lending. Section 3 presents the maximization problem of households
in the two markets. In Section 4, the market outcome of the equilibrium and
the optimal group lending contract are presented. In Section 5, we give a
numerical example to present the impact and the welfare effect of microfinance
in developing countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
The model is based on Berentsen et al. (2007). It uses the standard Lagos-
Wright structure, where time is discrete and every period consists of two sub-
periods. There exists a continuum [0,1] of infinitely living households and a
single microfinance institution (MFI). In each period, households trade their
produced goods at two sequentially opening markets. In subperiod A, house-
holds produce and trade the production good, and in subperiod B, the general
good. Both goods are perishable and cannot be stored. We assume that the two
markets are competitive and that no trading frictions exist. We will proceed by
illustrating the structure of the economy and the characteristics of households.
Then, we introduce fiat money and show how households can deposit money
balances, as well as take out consumption loans from the microfinance insti-
tution. Subsequently, we illustrate in Sections 2.1 how entrepreneurs start a
business and address the moral hazard problem with external funding. Section
2.2 shows the social planner problem.
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Figure 1: Timeline 
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Figure 1 displays the timeline of the model for a representative period t.
At the beginning of subperiod A, households are hit by a temporary prefer-
ence and technology shock. With probability 1− n, the household is a buyer ;
with probability nθ, he is an entrepreneur ; and with probability n(1 − θ), he
is a producer. Buyers can consume but cannot produce in the first market.
In contrast, producers can produce but cannot consume in the first market.
Producers may either produce in home production or work for entrepreneurs.
Finally, entrepreneurs have the possibility to start a small enterprise with one
employee. In contrast to producers, entrepreneurs cannot produce in home
production. We assume that the production technology of the enterprise is
superior to the home production technology. From now on, we will use the
term subsistence production for the inferior home production technology. Buy-
ers, entrepreneurs and subsistence producers trade in the first market, and
subsequently the market closes. In subperiod B, all households can consume,
produce and trade the general good in the second market.
Households have quasi-linear preferences, where qb (qs) is the amount of
the production good consumed (produced) in subperiod A.6 In subperiod B,
x (h) is the amount of the general good consumed (produced), and all house-
holds have the same productivity. Equation (1) displays the utility function
of a household. To account for the preference shock, the utility function of
households is modeled with an indicator function. When a household is hit by
the preference shock, then the indicator is one, otherwise it is zero. The utility
6The subscript b stands for buyer and the subscript s for subsistence producers. The pro-
duction of an enterprise will be denoted by subscript e.
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function of a representative household is
U(qb, qs, x, h) = 1u(qb)− (1− 1)c(qs) + U(x)− h, (1)
where 1 is the indicator, and c(qs) are the utility costs of producing the amount
qs of good q in subperiod A. The cost function c(·) is a convex function with
respect to q, where c(0) = 0, c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) > 0. The utility function
u(·) is a concave function with respect to q, where u(0) = 0, u′(0) = ∞, and
u′′(·) < 0. Good x can be consumed and produced in home production in
subperiod B by every household, where h are the utility costs. To ease the
calculation, we assume that the production of the general good is linear.7 The
utility function U(x) of the general good is a convex function.
We assume that households trade in anonymous goods markets. House-
holds are not able to recognize former trading partners in future meetings.
Hence, a role for a medium of exchange emerges. As the medium of exchange,
we introduce fiat money. Money is essential in the markets of the production
good and the general good, because there is no commitment and no record-
keeping in the two markets. Access to financial services is solely feasible over
the MFI. Households deposit money balances at the end of subperiod B and
receive interest in the next subperiod B, if they do not withdraw their bal-
ances. Buyers use their deposits and can additionally take out small loans
for consumption in subperiod A.8 Entrepreneurs can issue risky debt with a
special group lending contract. We will describe the group lending contract
below when we show how entrepreneurs start businesses.
The central bank directly influences the amount of fiat currency by means
of lump-sum transfers at the beginning of subperiod B. We assume that money
grows at a specific but constant rate. The stock of money is indicated by M ,
and the money growth rate is γ, where γ ≥ 1 (M = γM−1). Variables referring
7This is the standard assumption in Lagos-Wright models, that makes the model tractable.
Actually, we could also assume that the cost function is nonlinear and that U(x) is linear to
find a solution. For further discussions, see e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005).
8For the saving accounts of the Grameen Bank, it was initially only possible to withdraw
savings at an assigned time. In 2004, Grameen allowed customers to withdraw money at
will. Thus, today, saving accounts are utilized like current accounts. This has led to large
increases of Grameen’s deposit portfolio. Since the end of 2004, the deposits of the Grameen
Bank exceed their outstanding loans (Rutherford, 2006).
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to the previous (subsequent) period are indexed by −1 (+1). Households re-
ceive lump-sum transfers of τM−1 from the central bank. To meet the targeted
growth rate, it has to be the case that τ = γ − 1. The real price of money in
subperiod B is indicated by φ. The assumption of a constant money growth
rate implies that real money balances are time-invariant. Therefore, it is the
case that φ/φ+1 = M+1/M = γ. This is the standard way to model monetary
policy in the Lagos-Wright framework.
2.1 Starting a Business and External Funding
Entrepreneurs have a business idea and start a small business with one em-
ployee. Every entrepreneur is matched with one producer and makes a take-
it-or-leave-it wage offer that the producer accepts or declines. If the producer
declines the wage offer, he produces in home production at the subsistence
level. We assume that entrepreneurs have to pay wages in advance of the
production (cash-in-advance). This assumption can be motivated through a
lack of commitment. Thus, households are only willing to work if they are
compensated for their utility costs beforehand. The production technology of
the enterprise is superior to the home production technology. We assume that
the employee’s utility costs of producing the amount qe are K + c˜(qe). The
cost function consists of a fixed setup cost term and a variable cost term. The
variable cost term c˜(·) has the same features as c(·).
Entrepreneurship is subject to risk. Production is successful with a prob-
ability {µh, µl} < 1, depending on the behavior of the entrepreneur. If he
shirks, the production is successful with the lower probability µl, but the en-
trepreneur receives real, private benefit B. The difference between the two
probabilities of success is denoted by ∆µ.9 Agents can verify whether produc-
tion was successful, but the behavior of entrepreneurs is private information
and can only be revealed by monitoring. If the investment is financed exter-
nally, then the entrepreneur has an incentive to shirk. This is the standard
moral hazard problem similar to (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). We assume
9We assume that the expected profit of a shirking entrepreneur, who could finance the produc-
tion internally, is smaller than zero. The expected profit consists of sales if the production
is successful (with probability µl) plus the private benefit minus the wage costs for the
employee. Moreover, we assume that c˜(q)/µh < c(q), for all q > 0.
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that monitoring costs are proportional to the loan size and are denoted by δm.
For simplicity, we assume that monitoring entrepreneurs will always detect a
shirking peer and that strong enough means exist to sanction shirking peers.
Hence, if entrepreneurs monitor, shirking can be ruled out.
Let us shortly recapitulate the three obstacles that entrepreneurship faces:
First, the already discussed cash-in-advance constraint for enterprises. Sec-
ond, entrepreneurs are capital-constrained and need external funding. More
precisely, their savings are insufficient for self-financing the business and they
have no collateral. Finally, asymmetric information leads to a moral hazard
problem. The MFI solves the agency problem through group-lending contracts
with joint liability and enables entrepreneurship.
Group Lending Contract
We suppose that commercial loans are only available as group-lending con-
tracts.10 After the shock has been revealed, all entrepreneurs meet with the
local branch of the MFI to contract for loans. They are divided into small
groups of two.11 A representative group consists of entrepreneurs i and j. We
assume that they are protected by limited liability. Thus, the MFI can only
claim the returns of the project. Moreover, we assume joint liability, which
means that entrepreneurs have to take responsibility for the repayment if the
peer defaults. In our group lending contract, this means that borrower i pays
interest rate is if borrower j repays his loan, and if if the peer defaults (The
subscript s stands for success and f for failure). Typically, in this kind of
contract the interest rate if is greater than is.12
2.2 The Social Planner Allocation
The mission of the planner is to choose the quantities buyers consume and
producers produce of the production good and the general good. We assume
10MFIs offer larger loans that households can use to finance a marriage, a funeral and, es-
pecially, to start small enterprises. These loans can only be used for the stated purpose
and the requirements are higher. For example, the Grameen Bank offers different loan con-
tracts, ranging from housing loans to special investment loans intended for entrepreneurs
(Rutherford et al., 2004).
11For instance, the Grameen Bank lends money to groups of 5 (called kendras).
12In practice, institutions not only use group lending mechanisms with joint liability. Ar-
mendáriz and Morduch (2000) describe other mechanisms such as regular repayment sched-
ules or non-refinancing threats.
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that the planner sees whether entrepreneurs behave or shirk and is able to force
them to behave. The social planner maximizes the aggregated lifetime utility
of the households subject to the feasibility constraints. It is obvious that the
planner decides that all entrepreneurs start a business, since the returns are
higher than under subsistence production. The optimization problem of the
social planner is
W = 11− β {(1− n)u(qb)− nθK − nθc˜(qe)− n(1− 2θ)c(qs) + U(x)− h}, (2)
where welfare consists of net utility of subperiod A plus net utility of subperiod
B. The planner chooses the quantities produced and consumed in the two
subperiods. Equation (3) displays the optimal amount consumed (q∗b ) and
produced (q∗e , q∗s) in subperiod A.
u′(q∗b ) = c˜′(q∗e) = c′(q∗s). (3)
In subperiod B, every household produces and consumes the amount x∗ of
the general good such that U ′(x∗) = 1. In the optimal allocation, aggregate
production has to equal aggregate demand for both goods (q, x). Furthermore,
the social planner forces entrepreneurs to behave. Thus, the production is
successful with probability µh. The production market in subperiod A clears
if Equation (4) holds.
(1− n)q∗b = nθµhq∗e + n(1− 2θ)q∗s . (4)
3 The Goods Markets
The expected lifetime utility of a household can be specified in a recursive
way by value functions. In particular, V (·) denotes the value function at the
beginning of subperiod A, andW (·) denotes the value function at the beginning
of subperiod B. The ex-ante value function V (d) of a representative household
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at the beginning of period t with deposits d is given by
V (d) = (1− n){u(qb) +W (0, lb, d+ lb − pqb)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
buyer
+ nθ{−φδmlj + E{W}}︸ ︷︷ ︸
entrepreneur
(5)
+nθ{−K − c˜(qe) +W (d, 0, w)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
employee
+ n(1− 2θ){−c(qs) +W (d, 0, pqs)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
subsistence producer
.
To fully understand the value function V (d), we give a short description of the
four states. First, with probability 1− n, the household is a buyer. The term
in the curly brackets indicates the utility of a buyer consuming the amount qb
of the production good plus the continuation value of a buyer in subperiod B.
Second, with probability nθ, the household is an entrepreneur. The term in
curly brackets indicates the monitoring costs (which depend on the peer’s loan
size) plus the ex-ante expected continuation value of an entrepreneur. The
continuation value depends on the outcome of his own production and the
peer’s production. Third, with probability nθ, the household is an employee.
The term in curly brackets indicates the disutility of producing the amount
qe plus the continuation value of an employee in subperiod B. Finally, with
probability n(1 − 2θ), the household is a subsistence producer. The term in
curly brackets indicates the disutility of producing the amount qs plus the
value function of a producer with deposits d and income pqs in subperiod B.
Equation (6) shows the expected value of entering subperiod B of en-
trepreneur i, given that i and j behave. The expected continuation value
W (·) is the weighted sum of three possible outcomes: In the first outcome, the
production is a failure. In this case, entrepreneur i defaults and enters subpe-
riod B with no income. In the second outcome, the production of entrepreneur
i is successful and at the same time entrepreneur j repays his loan. In this
case, entrepreneur i only pays for his own obligations and makes a large profit.
In the third outcome, entrepreneur i is successful, but entrepreneur j defaults.
In this case, entrepreneur i not only has to come up for his own obligation, he
has also to repay part of borrower j’s loan. Entrepreneur i enters subperiod B
with a lower net profit than in the second case, which is indicated by Πl < Πh.
The business of entrepreneur i (j) is successful with probability µh,i (µh,j).
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E{W} = µh,iµh,jW (0, lpi ,Πh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j repays
+µh,i(1− µh,j)W (0, lpi ,Πl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j defaults
+ (1− µh,i)W (0, 0, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i defaults
.
(6)
To find the equilibrium, we start with the equilibrium conditions of the
general goods market and solve backwards to find the equilibrium in the pro-
duction market.
3.1 The General Goods Market (Subperiod B)
In subperiod B, households consume and produce the general good at home.
The amount consumed is denoted by x, and h denotes the produced amount.
Households discount time with β ∈ (0, 1). Households enter subperiod B with
heterogeneous portfolios of deposits (d), loans (l) and cash (m) and maximize
the value function with respect to x, h and d+1. The maximization problem
of a household entering subperiod B with the portfolio (d, l,m) is
W (d, l,m) = max
x,h,d+1
{U(x)− h+ βV+1(d+1)} (7)
s.t. x− h = φ[(1 + id)d+m+ τM−1 − d+1 − (1 + i)l],
where d+1 are deposits households place on the MFI for the subsequent period.
The interest rate i on loans depends on whether the household was a buyer
(id) or a successful entrepreneur (is, if ) in subperiod A. All values are stated
in real terms. Households have to choose x, h and d+1, thereby satisfying the
intertemporal budget constraint. The left-hand side of the budget constraint
is consumption x less the amount h produced of the general good. The right-
hand side consists of deposits of period t charged with interest, the lump-sum
transfer of the central bank less the deposits for period t+1, and loans charged
with the respective interest. Substituting the budget constraint for h gives
W (d, l,m) = max
x,d+1
{U(x)− x+ βV+1(d+1)
+φ[(1 + id)d+m+ τM−1 − d+1 − (1 + i)l]}.
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The optimal quantities of good x and deposits d+1 for the subsequent period
follow from the first order conditions:
U ′(x) = 1, (8)
βV ′+1(d+1) = φ. (9)
The marginal value of deposits has to be equal to φ/β in equilibrium. The
envelope condition for private saving is: Wd = φ(1 + id). The envelope con-
dition of borrowing money for consumption is: Wl = −φ(1 + id). And lastly,
the envelope condition of holding money is: Wm = φ. All households will
enter the next period with the same amount of deposits. This implies that
at the beginning of the subsequent period, the money holdings are degener-
ate, and the liability side of the MFI’s balance sheet is equal to the aggregate
of all households’ deposits d+1. The general goods market serves to simplify
calculations, since we do not have to keep track of the history of households’
deposits.
3.2 The Production Goods Market (Subperiod A)
At the beginning of subperiod A, the preference shock determines whether
households are buyers, producers or entrepreneurs. In the following, we will
present the optimization problem for each group.
Buyers
Buyers choose how much to demand of good q, taking prices as given. For
their expenses, they use their deposits and in addition have the possibility to
take out consumption loans (lb) from the MFI. The optimization problem of a
representative buyer is:
max
qb,lb
{u(qb) +W (0, lb, d+ lb − pqb)}, (10)
s.t. pqb ≤ d+ lb, (BC)
lb ≤ l¯, (LC)
where the budget constraint states that households can dispense up to the sum
of deposits d and the loan lb. The loan constraint states that the buyer can
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borrow up to the limit l¯. We will assume that buyers have no possibility to
default and that the MFI can reclaim consumption loans without costs; thus,
the (LC) is not binding. If this is the case, buyers optimally choose qb such
that the following equation is satisfied:
u′(qb) = φp(1 + id). (11)
For the detailed derivation with the first-order conditions, see Appendix A.1.
Producers
Subsistence producers choose the amount qs that maximizes profit, thereby
taking as given the price p. Producers incur utility costs c(qs) for producing the
amount qs. The optimization problem of a representative subsistence producer
is:
max
qs
{−c(qs) +W (d, 0, pqs)}. (12)
Because real balances enter the value function of submarket B in a linear
fashion, the optimization problem of subsistence producers can be stated as
φΠs = max
qs
{φpqs − c(qs)}, (13)
where real profit φΠs depends on the produced amount qs and the real price φp.
Assuming a convex cost function gives the standard solution where producers
set their marginal costs equal to the real price. Equation (14) displays the first
order condition that maximizes the profit of a household at the subsistence level
for a given real price.
c′(qs) = φp. (14)
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs take out loans from the MFI and start small enterprises that
produce with superior technology. To mitigate the agency problem between
lender and borrower, the MFI offers group lending contracts with joint liability.
In the following, we will present the optimization problem of a representative
group with entrepreneurs i and j that takes as given the lending mechanism
of the MFI. We assume that both entrepreneurs monitor each other and show
afterwards how the MFI’s group lending contract has to be designed to be
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incentive compatible. The optimization problem of entrepreneur i when he
monitors j is:
max
li,w,qe
E(Π) = µh,i[pqe − µh,j(1 + is)li − (1− µh,j)(1 + if )li]− d− δmlj, (15)
s.t. d+ li ≥ w, (FC)
w ≥ K/φ+ c˜(qe)/φ+ Πs. (PC)
With probability µh,i, the project is successful and i sells the amount qe at
the production market. The actual interest rate that entrepreneur i has to
pay depends on whether j repays his loan or not. With probability µh,j, en-
trepreneur j repays his loan and i has to pay interest rate is. With probability
1−µh,j, entrepreneur j defaults and i has to pay interest rate if . The last term
indicates the monitoring costs. Entrepreneur i has to satisfy two constraints:
First, the sum of deposits and the loan has to be greater or equal to the wage.
Second, the wage has to be greater or equal to the disutility costs of producing
qe plus the outside option of the employee. The outside option is production
at the subsistence level, which achieves a profit of Πs. See Section A.3 for the
optimization problem of a subsistence producer. The participation constraint
is satisfied if the wage is greater than the disutility of producing qe plus the
foregone profit Πs. Finally, the entrepreneur will only start the business if the
expected profit is greater than his own outside option–principal and interest
on deposits. The Lagrangian of the profit maximization problem with the two
Lagrange multiplier λl and λw is
L(qe, li, w) = µh,ipqe − µh,iµh,j(1 + is)li − µh,i(1− µh,j)(1 + if )li − d− δmlj
−λl[w − d− li]− λw[K
φ
+ c˜(qe)
φ
+ Πs − w].
The first-order conditions are:
qe : φµh,ip = λwc˜′(qe),
li : λl = µh,i[µh,j(1 + is) + (1− µh,j)(1 + if )],
w : λl = λw,
λl : li = w − d,
λw : w = K/φ+ c˜(qe)/φ+ Πs.
(16)
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Combining the second and the third FOC gives λw = µh,i[µh,j(1 + is) −
(1 − µh,j)(1 + if )]. The fourth and the fifth FOC are the standard loan and
wage constraints which have to hold with equality if the interest rate is greater
than zero and the entrepreneur maximizes his profit. Substituting the La-
grange multiplier λw in the first FOC and canceling µh,i on both sides gives
the following condition which has to hold if entrepreneurs maximize profit:
[µh,j(1 + is) + (1− µh,j)(1 + if )]c˜′(qe) = (1 + i¯)c˜′(qe) = φp. (17)
The term in the squared brackets is the expected interest rate an entrepreneur
has to pay if production is successful. It depends on the two interest rates and
also on the behavior of entrepreneur j.
4 Equilibrium
In this section, we assume that the microfinance institution maximizes social
benefit and is not profit-oriented. But in contrast to a social planner, the insti-
tution cannot force households to behave. Moreover, outstanding credits have
to be fully backed by deposits (no external sourcing). Furthermore, financial
operations have to be sustainable, as we suppose that the MFI receives no
subsidies. Therefore, the MFI offers group lending contracts with expected
returns that are equal to the deposit rate. Even though the returns from spe-
cific groups are stochastic, aggregated returns of the MFI are fully predictable.
The reason is that production failures are uncorrelated, and the law of large
numbers applies.
The Optimal Group Lending Contract
The MFI has to design the group lending contract with joint liability such
that entrepreneurs have incentives to monitor their peers.13 Remember that
an entrepreneur will behave if the peer monitors, since a detected entrepreneur
would be punished by severe social sanctions. Hence, monitoring induces good
13In reality, collusion between entrepreneurs can be a serious threat for the success of group
lending. However, the consideration of collusion is beyond the scope of our analysis and we
therefore assume that entrepreneurs do not collude. See e.g., Laffont and Rey (2003) on
collusion and group lending.
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behavior, and production of the peer is successful with probability µh. Assume
that entrepreneur i is monitored by the peer. It is optimal for entrepreneur i
to monitor if
µh,i[pqe − µh,j(1 + is)li − (1− µh,j)(1 + if )li]− d− δmlj ≥
µh,i[pqe − µl,j(1 + is)li − (1− µl,j)(1 + if )li]− d.
In a symmetric equilibrium li = lj = l. Then, it follows that the incentive
constraint to monitor is satisfied if
µh∆µ(if − is) ≥ δm. (18)
Zero Profit Condition of the MFI
The MFI has to pay interest rate id on deposits. Thus, the expected return
from the group lending contract has to be large enough. To break even, the
two interest rates is and if have to satisfy the following condition:
2µ2h(1 + is) + 2µh(1− µh)(1 + if ) = 2(1 + id), (19)
where the first term of the left-hand side is gross repayment of the group if both
households are successful (which occurs with probability µ2h), and the second
term is gross repayment if only one household is successful (which occurs with
probability 2µh(1 − µh)). The right-hand side are the gross deposit costs the
MFI has to pay. Entrepreneurs’ loans and deposits have been normalized.
To derive the interest rate is, we assume that Equation (18) is satisfied with
equality and substitute for if . We obtain
µ2h(1 + is) + µh(1− µh)(1 + is +
δm
µh∆µ
) = 1 + id. (20)
Business Funding
Entrepreneurship exists if two constraints are satisfied: On the one hand, the
MFI has to satisfy the incentive constraints of the entrepreneurs, and it has
to respect the limited liability clause. The MFI will only give credit if profits
are greater than the repayment obligation in the event that the peer defaults.
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pq∗e − (1 + if )[K/φ+ c˜(q∗e)/φ+ Πs − d] ≥ 0. (21)
On the other hand, entrepreneurs will only start the business if expected profits
are greater than the principal and interest on deposits. Entrepreneurs only take
out loans if the following condition is satisfied:
µh[pq∗e − (1 + i¯)(K/φ+ c˜(q∗e)/φ+ Πs − d)] (22)
−δm[K/φ+ c˜(q∗e)/φ+ Πs − d] ≥ (1− id)d.
Whether the former or the latter constraint is more restrictive depends on the
parameterization of the monitoring costs and the difference between if and i¯.
Usually, Equation (22) is more restrictive. Furthermore, above the threshold
exists a small range, where only part of the entrepreneurs are active. The
rate of active entrepreneurs is determined through an indifference condition:
Entrepreneurs enter production up to a rate where the expected profit is equal
to the outside option.
Equilibrium of the Financial and the Real Market
In the equilibrium of the production market, supply has to equal demand. The
demand side is the fraction of households hit by the preference shock 1 − n.
The supply side consists of the aggregate output of successful entrepreneurs
and of subsistence producers. The market clearing condition of the production
market, assuming no search frictions, is
n(1− 2θ)qs + nθµhqe = (1− n)qb. (23)
Combining the FOCs of entrepreneurs and subsistence producers with the FOC
of buyers yield the relationship between the equilibrium quantities produced
and consumed and the interest rates.
u′(qb)
c′(qs)
= (1 + id), (24)
u′(qb)
c˜′(qe)
= (1 + i¯)(1 + id), (25)
where i¯ ≡ µhis + (1− µh)if .
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Rate i¯ is the expected interest rate a successful entrepreneur has to pay,
given that the peer behaves. The interest rates on deposits and on loans
drive a wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal
cost of production. The higher the interest rates are, the further away is the
economy from the first best allocation where the ratio of the marginal utility
of consumption and the marginal cost of production are equal.
At the beginning of the section, we ruled out external sourcing possibili-
ties for the MFI. More specifically, we assume that all loans have to be fully
covered by deposits and that the MFI is not dependent on subsidies. Hence,
aggregated deposits have to be greater or equal to demanded loans. In the
optimal allocation, the two measures are equal.
n(1− θ)d = nθl + (1− n)lb. (26)
Marginal Value of Deposits
To obtain the marginal value of deposits, we first take the derivative of Equa-
tion (5).
∂V (d)
∂d
= (1− n)u
′(qb)
p
+ n(1− θ)(1 + id)φ+ nθ∂E{W}
∂d
. (27)
If the household is a buyer, he receives marginal utility of u′(qb)/p. If he is a
producer, he receives principal and interest in subperiod B and can consume
the general good. If, instead, he is an entrepreneur, Lemma 1 below reveals
that the marginal value of deposits is the same as for the producer.
Lemma 1 For l > 0, the marginal value of holding deposits for an entrepreneur
is equal to (1 + id)φ.
Proof. To verify Lemma 1, note that if entrepreneurs are not credit-
constrained, then the equilibrium wage of the employee is independent of d.
This implies that, when the entrepreneur increases his deposits, he is able to
decrease the loan by the same amount. This implies that the marginal value of
deposits is equal to the negative value of the expected marginal value of loans
of an entrepreneur.
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The expected marginal value of loans depends on the outcome of production
and the respective interest rate that the entrepreneur has to pay. There are
three outcomes: In the first outcome, the entrepreneur defaults and pays zero.
In the second outcome, both entrepreneurs are successful, and the gross interest
rate is 1 + is. Finally, the peer entrepreneur defaults, and the gross interest
rate is 1 + if . Thus, the negative value of the ex-ante expected marginal value
of loans is: φµh(1 + i¯). Using Equation (19) gives: φµh(1 + i¯) = φ(1 + id).
In the next step, we substitute p by using the equilibrium condition of en-
trepreneurs (Equation (17)). Finally, we replace the left-hand side of Equation
(27) by using the lagged intertemporal optimality condition (Equation (9)).14
This gives the equilibrium relationship between the marginal utility of con-
sumption and the marginal cost of industrial production conditional on the
growth rate of money and the interest rate.
γ − β
β
= (1− n)
[
µhu
′(qb)
(1 + i¯)c˜′(qe)
− 1
]
+ nid. (28)
Using the equilibrium condition of industrial production (Equation (25)) shows
that one plus the deposit rate is equal to γ/β.
γ
β
= (1 + r)γ = 1 + id. (29)
Real Value of Deposits
The real value of deposits (φd) can be derived by using the clearing condi-
tion of the MFI (Equation (26)). Recall from the optimization problem of
entrepreneurs that l = K/φ+ c˜(qe)/φ+Πs−d, and from the budget constraint
of buyers that lb = pqb − d. Using, once again, the optimality condition of
the entrepreneur to replace p and the market clearing condition of the produc-
tion market gives the real value of deposits, where the superscript ∗ denotes
equilibrium values:
φd = (1−n)(1 + i¯)c˜′(q∗e)q∗b +nθK +nθc˜(q∗e) +nθ[(1 + i¯)c˜′(q∗e)q∗s − c(q∗s)]. (30)
14We use the long-term relation of the growth rate of money and the real value of money:
φ = φ−1γ.
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Equation (30) shows that the real value of deposits depends on the ex-
pected interest rate that producing households have to pay in order to receive
a loan. The real price of money (φ) can be determined by substituting d by the
money stock M−1. All these conditions have to be satisfied in the symmetric,
stationary equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium) The symmetric, stationary equilibrium {qb, qe,
qs, x, p, φ, id} satisfies the equilibrium equations (20), (21), (23), (24), (25),
(26), (29) and (30). The interest rate id, the real price of money φ, and the
price p result from the monetary policy of the central bank, which decides over
the parameter values {M,γ}.
5 Discussion
In this section, we analyze the economic equilibrium of our model. We suppose
that the microfinance institution receives no subsidies and is in our case fully
independent of commercial banks or the financial market. It provides basic
financial services to the households. In Section 5.1, we offer a numerical exam-
ple to present the equilibrium outcome of our model and give the intuition to
our results. In Section 5.2, we compute the welfare costs for different money
growth rates. Moreover, we compute the welfare costs of having no access to
financial services for given monetary policies.
5.1 Numerical Example
We suppose that a household is with probability 0.6 a buyer, with probability
0.3 a producer, and with probability 0.1 an entrepreneur with a business idea.
For our numerical example, we use the same utility and disutility functions
as in Lagos and Wright (2005). We assume that the disutility function of the
employee is identical to the function of producers, but scaled down by the
factor a < 1. Equation (31) displays the utility functions and the disutility
functions of the households. The disutility function in market 2 is linear for
all households.
u(q) = A(q + b)
1−η − b1−η
1− η , U(x) = D log(x), c(q) = q
ρ, c˜(q) = aqρ, (31)
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where D = 3 and ρ = 2.5. For the cost function of entrepreneurs, we assume
that a = 0.25 and the setup costs are K = 0.2. The success probability is
µh = 0.9 if the entrepreneur behaves, while it is µh = 0.3 and he receives
a private benefit of B = 0.3 if the entrepreneur shirks. Monitoring costs of
entrepreneurs are δml, with δm = 0.05. The remaining parameter values are
A = 1, b ≈ 0 and η = 0.3.15
Figure 2 displays sales and expenses of a representative entrepreneur as a
function of the deposit rate id. The dark blue line indicates the sales of the
enterprise. Sales are decreasing with the deposit rate. The other three lines
display monitoring costs, labor costs and interest costs. The cost components
are added up in the figure. Thus, the blue line marks the aggregated expenses
of the enterprise.
Figure 2: Enterprise’s sales and expenses
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Increasing the inflation rate leads to a rise of the equilibrium deposit rate.
Higher inflation rates, therefore, increase the funding costs of entrepreneurs.
Funding costs are steadily increasing with the deposit rate. Monitoring costs
are low and increase only marginally with the deposit rate. Labor costs ac-
count for the largest part of the expenses. Wages are slightly decreasing,
since real output declines if the inflation rate increases. For deposit rates
above 20 percent, the expected profits of entrepreneurs are smaller than their
outside option–leaving deposits at the MFI and instead receiving interest in
15Table 2 in the Appendix reports all underlying parameter values for the numerical example.
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subperiod B. Thus, above this threshold rate, entrepreneurship collapses and
entrepreneurs will be inactive.
The funding costs for entrepreneurs are relatively small if the rate of infla-
tion is low. In such an environment, enterprises can resort to their superior
technology. Enterprises’ profits are greater than their outside option. However,
if the inflation rate increases, subsistence production becomes more and more
advantageous, for the reason that home production involves no external fund-
ing. Ultimately, very high inflation rates lead to a collapse of entrepreneurship.
Figure 3 illustrates how the threshold value of entrepreneurs’ production
depends on the cost advantage and the inflation rate. In the area below the
line, only subsistence production exists. For the case that the technology of
enterprises is only slightly superior to the subsistence technology, the threshold
value is very low. The more advanced the production technology is, the larger
is the array where entrepreneurship is profitable.
Figure 3: The collapse of entrepreneurship
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A further question of interest is how monetary policy affects the borrow-
ing behavior of poor households. Figure 4 compares the credit volume of a
consuming household to the credit volume of an entrepreneur as functions of
the deposit rate. The commercial credit is nearly constant up to the threshold
value, beyond which it collapses to zero. If the deposit rate is exactly 20 per-
cent, only part of the entrepreneurs are active. At this rate entrepreneurs are
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indifferent between starting a business and their outside option. Contrary to
commercial credits, the volume of the consumer credit increases regularly with
the deposit rate. Above the threshold, the consumer credit jumps to a higher
volume. If the deposit rate is 20 percent, the credit volume lies between the
two values.
Figure 4: Consumer credit and commercial credit
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We will show in Section 5.2 that the impact on social welfare is largest if
households take out commercial and consumer loans simultaneously. The dis-
covered link between monetary policy and the credit composition (commercial
versus consumer credits) in our model is also important for another reason:
The empirical finance literature finds a positive relationship between enterprise
credits and economic growth, whereas the relationship between consumer cred-
its and growth is insignificant (Beck et al., 2012).
5.2 Welfare Implications
Welfare of households depends on the amount of production and consumption.
The equilibrium outcome is affected by the inflation rate, which in turn is
induced by the central bank through the money growth rate. The aggregated
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steady state lifetime utility of households is
W = 11− β {(1−n)u(qb)−nθK−nθc˜(qe)−nθφδml−n(1−2θ)c(qs)+U(x)−x}.
(32)
The expected utility of one household at the beginning of the period consists
of the expected net utility of the two subperiods. In subperiod A, it is the
probability of being a consuming household times the utility of consumption
minus the probability of being an entrepreneur or a producer times the disu-
tility of production. In subperiod B, it is the utility of consumption minus
the production of the general good, since all households consume the general
good.16
To derive the welfare costs of inflation, we apply the standard approach
used in search-theoretic monetary models (see e.g., Lagos and Wright (2005)
or Craig and Rocheteau (2008)). We ask what fraction of consumption would
households be willing to give up in order to change inflation from pi0 to pi1. We
denote the fraction of consumption by ∆. The aggregated steady state lifetime
utility of a household that decreases its overall consumption by the fraction ∆
is:
W∆ = 11− β {(1− n)u((1−∆)qb)− nθ(K + c˜(qe) + φδml) (33)
−n(1− 2θ)c(qs) + U((1−∆)x)− x}.
To obtain the welfare costs of increasing inflation from pi0 to pi1, we compute
the ∆, which sets W∆(pi0) =W(pi1).
Table 1 compares the real price, consumption and production quantities in
equilibrium for inflation rates of -5%, 10%, 14%, 20% and 30%. Entrepreneur-
ship collapses at an inflation rate of 14 percent–which is the inflation threshold
in our numerical example. For the two cases with higher inflation rates, the
output of enterprises is zero. In contrast, the output of subsistence producers
decreases only slightly with higher inflation rates.
16The formula for aggregated steady state welfare is similar to the optimization problem of the
social planner. However, in contrast to Section 2.1, the quantities produced and consumed
are now chosen by the households.
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Table 1: Welfare costs of inflation
γ = β γ = 1.00 γ = 1.14 γ = 1.20 γ = 1.30
φ p 1.2803 1.2320 1.1548 1.1403 1.0668
qb 0.4389 0.4204 0.3371 0.2963 0.2834
qs 0.6400 0.6239 0.5975 0.5926 0.5668
qe 1.5035 1.4163 1.2429 0 0
active 1 1 0.44 0 0
Welfare costs:
MFI – 0% 0.66% 1.12% 1.20%
no MFI 1.01% 1.02% 1.17% 1.25% 1.41%
Notes: active indicates the rate of active entrepreneurs; no MFI indicates that house-
holds have no access to financial services. In the benchmark case all households have
access to the MFI, and the central bank implements the Friedman rule. Entrepreneur-
ship collapses at an inflation rate of 14 percent.
In the lower part of the table, we display the welfare costs of inflation.17 The
first row depicts the costs of inflation, given that households have access to the
microfinance institution, in comparison to the Friedman rule (our benchmark).
For low rates, the welfare costs of inflation are small. However, welfare costs are
much higher if inflation rates are high. The reason is that if inflation lies above
the threshold value, entrepreneurship collapses. Hence, at moderate inflation
rates welfare costs are negligible, but, above a certain threshold, welfare costs
increase substantially.
Another important result of our model is that monetary policy affects the
impact of microfinance. The last row of the table depicts the costs of infla-
tion given that households have no access to the microfinance institution.18
The comparison of welfare costs with and without a microfinance institution
discloses that establishing microfinance institutions generally increases social
welfare. However, the magnitude of the positive impact depends crucially on
17Lagos and Wright (2005) show that the costs of inflation can be significantly larger when
trading frictions are taken into account or other pricing mechanisms are applied.
18Welfare costs without access to financial services are again measured relative to the bench-
mark case, where every household has access to financial services. To calculate social welfare
without access to the MFI, we closely follow Berentsen et al. (2007): We first set id = 0
in Equation (28) to derive the equilibrium amounts of the production good and afterwards
calculate social welfare.
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the inflation rate. The welfare impact of microfinance is largest for moderate
inflation rates, where external funding enables entrepreneurship and consump-
tion smoothing. For inflation rates above the threshold, the welfare impact
of microfinance is smaller, since households use loans solely for consumption
smoothing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of microfinance and inflation on so-
cial welfare in developing countries. In our theoretical model, group lending
mitigates the agency problem between entrepreneurs and the microfinance in-
stitution, which in turn allows entrepreneurship to emerge. At the same time,
access to financial services affects households’ decision to hold money bal-
ances, to save and to borrow. Under moderate inflation rates, entrepreneur-
ship emerges, which in turn increases aggregate production and reduces real
prices. Households receive interest payments on their deposits and benefit
from the possibility to take out loans. Yet, subsistence producers, without
profitable business ideas, are negatively affected by the general equilibrium
effect on prices.
Our main result is that entrepreneurship collapses above an inflation thresh-
old. A higher rate of inflation negatively affects entrepreneurship through two
mechanisms. First, the standard real balance effect of inflation lowers out-
put and expected real profits of entrepreneurs. Second, inflation increases the
funding costs of entrepreneurs. The real balance effect affects subsistence pro-
ducers and entrepreneurs alike, whereas the effect on funding costs applies
only to entrepreneurs. There exists an inflation threshold beyond which en-
trepreneurship collapses, because entrepreneurs who rely on external funding
are more affected by inflation than subsistence producers.
Our welfare analysis shows that the magnitude of the impact of micro-
finance on households’ welfare crucially depends on the prevailing monetary
policy regime. Microfinance has the largest impact on social welfare if inflation
is moderate and households use loans to start small enterprises as well as for
consumption smoothing. If inflation is high, the impact of microfinance on
welfare decreases substantially, as entrepreneurship collapses and households
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use loans solely for consumption smoothing. Our findings imply that a rea-
sonable monetary policy is especially important in developing countries, where
households face high transaction costs and information problems when apply-
ing for small loans. Better knowledge of the relationship between monetary
policy and economic development and growth is of great interest for central
banks, the World Bank and development agencies, but primarily to improve
the quality of life of the people in developing countries.
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A Appendix
A.1 Optimization Problem of Buyers
The optimization problem of the buyer with access to the MFI is:
max
qb,lb
{u(qb) +W (0, lb, d+ lb − pqb)}, (34)
s.t. pqb ≤ d+ lb, (BC)
lb ≤ l¯. (LC)
The Lagrangian of the maximization problem is:
L(qb, lb) = u(qb) +W (0, lb, d+ lb − pqb)− λφ[pqb − d− lb]− λlφ[lb − l¯]. (35)
The first-order conditions are:
qb : u′(qb) = pWm + λlφp,
lb : (λ− λl)φ = −Wl −Wm,
λ : lb = pqb − d,
λl : 0 ≥ lb − l¯.
(36)
Using the envelope conditions of holding money and borrowing money from
Section 3.1 and substituting these into the second FOC gives λ−λl = id. The
difference between the multiplier of the budget constraint and the multiplier
of the loan constraint is equal to the marginal change in utility. If the lending
constraint (LC) is binding, then λl > 0 and the buyer borrows lb = l¯. For
the case that the lending constraint is not binding, λl = 0. In our model, we
assume that the borrowing constraint will never be binding. In this case, the
consumer chooses lb such that in equilibrium the multiplier λ is equal to id.
Using this result and again the envelope condition for the first FOC gives the
following condition which has to hold if buyers maximize utility:
u′(qb) = φp(1 + id). (37)
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A.2 Optimization Problem of Subsistence Producers
Subsistence producers choose the amount qs that maximizes profit, thereby
taking as given the price p. Producers incur utility costs c(qs) for producing
the amount qs. Subsistence producers’ optimization problem is:
max
qs
{−c(qs) +W (d, 0, pqs)}. (38)
The first-order condition is:
qs : c′(qb) = pWm = φp. (39)
A.3 Optimization Problem of Unbanked Households
The unbanked households can neither hold deposits nor take out loans. Buy-
ers choose how much to demand of good q. Their optimization problem is
formulated as follows:
max
qb
{u(qb) +W (0, 0,m− pqb)}, (40)
s.t. pqb ≤ m, (BC)
where the constraint states that households can dispense up to their money
holdings m. The Lagrangian of the maximization problem of the buyer is
L(qb) = u(qb) +W (0, 0,m− pqb)− λmφ[pqb −m]. (41)
The first-order conditions are:
qb : u′(qb) = Wmp+ λmφp,
λm : m = pqb.
(42)
The envelope condition for holding money states that Wm = φ. In the opti-
mum, buyers choose qb such that the following equation is satisfied:
u′(qb) = φp(1 + λm). (43)
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If the budget restriction of the buyer is binding, then he will consume: qb =
m/p. If the buyer’s money balance is sufficiently large, he will consume the
amount of the production good that sets marginal utility equal to the real
price. In this case, λm is equal to zero.
Subsistence producers choose the amount qs that maximizes profit, thereby
taking as given the price p. Households incur utility costs c(qs) for producing
the amount qs. Their optimization problem is formulated as follows:
max
qs
{−c(qs) +W (0, 0, pqs)}. (44)
The Lagrangian of the maximization problem of the subsistence producer is
L(qs) = −c(qs) +W (0, 0,m+ pqs). (45)
The first-order condition is:
c′(qs) = Wmp = φp. (46)
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A.4 Parameter Values
Table 2: Parameter values of the numerical example
Parameter Values Description
A 1 parameter of the utility function
a 0.25 entrepreneurs’ cost factor
B 0.3 entrepreneurs’ private benefit
b 0 parameter of the utility function
β 0.95 discount factor
D 3 parameter of the utility function
δm 0.05 monitoring costs
η 0.3 parameter of the utility function
K 0.2 setup costs of entrepreneurs
µh 0.9 success rate, high
µl 0.3 success rate, low
n 0.4 rate of producers and entrepreneurs
θ 0.25 ratio of entrepreneurs to producers
ρ 2.5 parameter of the production function
Notes: Standard parameter values are similar to Lagos and Wright (2005).
Chapter II
The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests
Abstract
We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment
of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay
auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability
and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of doping
substances is costly but not further regulated. The main finding of the analysis
is the existence of a doping threshold. In our leading case only strong athletes
dope. The level of the doping threshold is increasing in the doping costs and
decreasing in the prize level. Furthermore, increasing the number of athletes
affects the doping decision in two ways. More competition increases the incen-
tives to dope for strong athletes. At the same time, we find a discouragement
effect for weak athletes.
Keywords: Auctions, Contests, Doping, Heterogeneity,
Private Information.
JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, the number of athletes tested positive for doping has sub-
stantially increased. Positive doping cases have been covered by the media
particularly in professional cycling. The Festina affair in 1998 and the Fuentes
scandal in 2006, followed by extensive legal investigations, show that many
favorites and even entire cycling teams doped systematically.1 The recently
published material from the investigations of the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency
against Lance Armstrong and the U.S. Postal Service Team reveal the actual
dimension of doping in professional cycling (USADA, 2012). Doping is, how-
ever, by no means a new phenomenon. Written sources show that already in
ancient Greece athletes used stimulants and dubious mixtures to enhance their
strength and endurance (Verroken, 2005).
A closer look at doping practices reveals that athletes either dope during
the training period, directly before a competition, or do both. Performance-
enhancing drugs are popular because of their immediate and strong impact on
individual performance. Drugs instantaneously improve performance, whereas
training is time consuming and affects the performance only in the long run.
Moreover, many drugs are only detectable for a short period of time. These
features make doping especially attractive for athletes who wish to further
enhance their performance shortly before a contest. A better understanding of
athletes’ incentives to take drugs is an important prerequisite to increase the
efficiency of anti-doping policies.
Anti-doping agencies and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have
the objective to establish a doping-free environment for sports contests. The
regulator, however, cannot directly control whether athletes take performance-
enhancing drugs. Asymmetric information makes detection difficult and ex-
pensive. The current policies of anti-doping agencies are out-of-competition as
well as in-competition doping controls and the sanctioning of convicted ath-
letes. The ongoing doping cases in sports such as athletics, professional cycling
or weight lifting show that despite severe sanctions and public humiliation in
the case of detection, doping remains present in professional sports. Some
1Dilger et al. (2007) give a short review of the history of doping and present recent doping
scandals in professional cycling and in athletics.
Introduction 37
experts even believe that doping has increased in particular sports due to the
ongoing commercialization and the development of more effective drugs.
Asymmetric information can occur at several levels. The existing doping
literature has primarily focused on asymmetric information between athletes
and the regulator, leaving aside considerations about asymmetric information
between athletes. Muehlheusser (2006) emphasizes the relevance of informa-
tional asymmetries in sports and recommends taking them into account when
designing contests. Each athlete has private information about his actual
physical ability, but can only guess the abilities of his rivals. The behavior
of athletes in camouflaging and even misrepresenting their actual ability indi-
cates that this informational advantage is important.2 An athlete’s decision to
use performance-enhancing drugs will hence not only depend on regulations,
but also on private information concerning his ability. So far, this issue has
been neglected by the doping literature. The aim of this paper is to investi-
gate the rationale of doping in a heterogeneous n-player game under private
information.
Many researchers have studied the doping problem in the context of actual
or potential anti-doping regulations. Berentsen (2002) is one of the first to
analyze anti-doping regulations in a strategic two-player game.3 Cheating and
doping have recently been introduced into the theory of contests and tourna-
ments. Their common basis is the Lazear-Rosen tournament model, extended
to include a regulator who audits the athletes. Kräkel (2007), for example, an-
alyzes the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes who optimize the use of
doping and legal inputs.4 Another strand of the doping literature has focused
on fair play norms and on peer group approval based on past doping decisions
(Eber, 2008, 2011; Strulik, 2012). In both approaches an equilibrium without
doping is possible; however, a reliable coordination mechanism is needed to
2For instance, athletes play down their actual form or, conversely, conceal injuries and illnesses
at press conferences.
3For similar contributions, see e.g., Eber and Thépot (1999), Maennig (2002), Haugen (2004).
Berentsen and Lengwiler (2004) analyze doping and fraudulent accounting in an evolutionary
game.
4Analogous is Stowe and Gilpatric (2010) who focus instead on the doping decision and
different regulation regimes. Curry and Mongrain (2009) investigate the effects of the prize
structure. Finally, Gilpatric (2011) analyzes how enforcement affects the effort levels.
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make this equilibrium stable.5
Our paper is closely related to the literature that analyzes cheating in
tournament models. In contrast to the random component in Lazear-Rosen
tournament models, we assume that athletes’ abilities are heterogeneously dis-
tributed and private information. As the interest lies in identifying how het-
erogeneity affects doping behavior under private information, we assume that
taking performance-enhancing drugs is costly and ignore further anti-doping
regulations for the moment. The information structure of the contest is the
following: In stage one, nature independently draws athletes’ abilities from a
distribution. The number of athletes and the distribution is common knowl-
edge. The actual ability of the athlete, however, is private information. In
stage two, athletes may improve their performance by taking performance-
enhancing drugs. They base their doping decision on their actual ability and
their beliefs about the abilities of their competitors. Finally, in stage three,
the athlete with the greatest performance–the combination of ability and the
chosen amount of doping–wins the prize money.
Our private information setting with heterogeneous athletes yields new in-
sights which complement the results of existing doping literature. We analyze
how the prize amount, the doping costs, the number of athletes and the distri-
bution of abilities affect athletes’ doping behavior. We show that under private
information not all athletes take performance-enhancing drugs. For the ma-
jority of underlying parameter values, there exists a doping threshold. In our
leading case, strong athletes dope, and athletes beneath the doping threshold
have no incentive to dope. The doping behavior of an athlete depends cru-
cially on his actual ability and the degree of competition. If the degree of
competition increases, strong athletes take larger amounts of drugs. At the
same time there exists a discouragement effect for athletes with low abilities.
The anticipation of encountering stronger athletes in the contest discourages
weak athletes from doping. For nonstandard parameterizations, three other
equilibrium outcomes occur.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model
5Bird and Wagner (1997) were the first who proposed decentralized mechanisms based on
social norms to solve the doping problem. An example of such a mechanism is whistleblowing
(see e.g., Berentsen et al., 2008).
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and present the main results. In Section 3, we formally derive the equilibrium
outcome with the doping threshold. In Section 4, we discuss the results of
the doping model. First, we show how the doping threshold depends on the
number of athletes and on the ratio of prize money to doping costs. Second,
we analyze the influence of the distribution of abilities. Finally, we display the
equilibrium results under special parameterizations. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Main Results
In a contest, n athletes compete against each other. The winner receives prize
money v. All athletes are risk-neutral and maximize their expected payoff.
Figure 1 displays the information structure of the contest. In stage one, nature
independently draws athletes’ abilities ai, for i = 1, ..., n. The abilities are
drawn from a given cumulative distribution function F with support [0, 1].
More specifically, we assume a power function distribution F (a) = aα. This
flexible functional form allows us to analyze the doping incentives for different
shapes of the distribution. At the same time it ensures an explicit solution.
The number of athletes and the distribution are common knowledge. The
actual ability of the athlete, however, is private information.
Figure 1: The information structure of the contest
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In stage two, athletes may improve their performance by taking performance-
enhancing drugs. The athlete’s performance pi is a linear combination of his
ability ai and the amount of doping di he chooses to take: pi = ai + di. We
assume that athletes are free to choose an arbitrary doping amount and are
not limited to the two discrete options of doping or not doping.6 Athletes base
6The model can readily be adapted to apply to a binary decision between doping and not
doping. Note that this modification would not change the qualitative results.
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their doping decision on their actual ability and their beliefs about the abilities
of their competitors. Doping substances are not free of charge and the athlete
has to pay for his doping substances before the contest begins. Since we are
interested in how heterogeneity affects doping behavior under private informa-
tion, we assume that taking performance-enhancing drugs is costly and ignore
further anti-doping regulations for the moment.7
Finally, in stage three, the athlete with the greatest performance–the com-
bination of ability and the chosen amount of doping–wins the prize money.
For simplicity, the athlete with the greatest performance wins with certainty.8
In a world without doping, the athlete with the greatest ability would win the
contest. However, as athletes can choose arbitrary amounts of doping, it is, in
principal, possible for a weaker athlete to beat a more talented athlete. Each
athlete thus faces a trade-off between gaining a higher likelihood of winning
through doping and the increased costs.
The doping amount is the difference between the athlete’s performance pi
and his ability ai. If an athlete’s performance is equal to his ability, then
he does not dope and his doping costs are zero. Every athlete’s doping cost
function is thus a function of the difference pi − ai. The doping costs are
c(p − ai), where the parameter c indicates the magnitude of marginal doping
costs. The linearity of the function ensures a closed-form solution. The cost
function is the same for all athletes. We denote the ratio of prize money to
marginal doping costs by w (w ≡ v/c). From now on, we will assume that the
parameter values of α, n and w satisfy α(n − 1) ≥ 1 and wα(n − 1) > 1 and
use the term leading case for these parameterizations. In Section 4.3, we will
relax these assumptions and address special cases.9
The athlete’s probability of winning depends on his chosen performance
p and on the performances of the other athletes. The athlete only wins the
contest if his performance p(ai) is greater than the performances of all other
athletes. On the other hand, the costs accrue even if the athlete does not win
7This is comparable to a situation with toothless anti-doping regulations. For example, if
athletes can easily manipulate their test results.
8See e.g. Kovenock et al. (1996) for all-pay auctions with complete information. For all-pay
auctions with private information, see among others Amann and Leininger (1996) and Feess
et al. (2008).
9See Appendix A.2 for an overview of all possible cases and their underlying conditions.
The Model and Main Results 41
the contest. Equation (1) displays the payoffs of an athlete with ability ai who
chooses the performance p(ai).
Π(ai) =
 v − c(p(ai)− ai) if p(ai) > maxj 6=i p(aj),−c(p(ai)− ai) if p(ai) < maxj 6=i p(aj), (1)
nonnegativity constraint: p(ai) ≥ ai. (2)
Negative doping amounts are ruled out by assumption (di ≥ 0). Therefore,
the nonnegativity constraint p(ai) ≥ ai has to hold for every possible ai. Fur-
thermore, in case of a tie between m athletes (m ≤ n), the prize money is split
up equally between the m athletes.
We are interested in athletes’ optimal doping behavior. More precisely, we
present the symmetric equilibrium performance function of the athletes. In
equilibrium there exists a doping threshold. Athletes with ability below the
threshold do not dope, whereas athletes with ability above the threshold do
dope. Theorem 1 presents the equilibrium outcome of the doping model.
Theorem 1 There exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure-strategies with
the doping threshold a?, for parameterizations that satisfy the conditions of the
leading case. In the symmetric equilibrium, an athlete with ability a chooses
the performance
p(a) =
 a if a < a
?,
a? + w
[
aα(n−1) − a?α(n−1)
]
if a ≥ a?. (3)
The unique doping threshold a? is
a? = [αw(n− 1)] 11−α(n−1) . (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.10
10The proof relies on the intermediate results of Section 3. Therefore, we recommend that
readers cover Section 3 before turning to the proof.
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3 The Doping Equilibrium
The actual contest is similar to an all-pay auction where every athlete has
to pay for his personal doping amounts. We are interested in an equilibrium
performance function which is increasing in a. If this is the case, then the
probability of winning G(a) is the c.d.f. of the highest order statistic A(n−1:n−1)
of the remaining athletes.11 Given the assumed power function distribution,
the probability of having the greatest ability is G(a) = Pr{A(n−1:n−1) ≤ a} =
F (a)n−1 = aα(n−1).
In order to find the symmetric Nash equilibrium in the doping contest, we
apply the usual approach used in auction theory. First, we assume that in a
symmetric Nash equilibrium an athlete with ability a chooses the performance
p(a) and then formulate the expected return for this athlete (using the highest
order statistic). Every athlete can deviate from his equilibrium strategy by
choosing another performance. However, it does not make sense to choose a
performance lower than p(0) or higher than p(1). In the first instance, one
would never win, and, in the second instance, one would always win, but have
to pay too much. For this reason, deviations from the equilibrium performance
function can be modeled as follows: An athlete with ability a who pretends
to have a different ability x chooses the associated performance p(x) in the
contest through adjusting the doping amount.
The expected utility function of an athlete with ability a, who pretends
to have ability x, is the product of the prize v multiplied by the winning
probability of an athlete with ability x minus the cost of doping necessary in
order to achieve the performance p(x). His expected utility is thus: u(a, x) =
vG(x)−c(p(x)−a). The athlete will choose the x that maximizes his expected
utility. He can only imitate performances that are equal to or greater than his
ability, since the amount of doping cannot be negative. In equilibrium, the
nonnegativity constraint p(a) ≥ a has to hold for every possible a.
The main contribution of this paper is the equilibrium performance function
where the nonnegativity constraint is binding. However, in a fist step, the
doping equilibrium is derived for cases where the constraint is not binding.12
11For further information on order statistics, see David and Nagaraja (2003).
12The nonnoegativity constraint is not binding if α < (n− 1)−1 and w > 1.
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This is done in order to introduce the basic solution technique and to emphasize
the importance of the nonnegativity constraint. If the nonnegativity constraint
is not binding, then, the equilibrium performance function can be derived in
the following way.
To obtain the optimum, we differentiate the utility function with respect
to x and set it equal to zero. We obtain the FOC: vG′(x) − cp′(x) = 0. The
optimal behavior of an athlete with ability ai is to imitate the strategy of an
athlete with ability x so that the FOC is satisfied.
In addition to the FOC, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint has to
be satisfied for every possible a in the Nash equilibrium. There must be no
gain in deviating from the equilibrium strategy. The IC constraint is satisfied
if u(a, a) > u(a, x) for all a, x. We assume that if an athlete is indifferent
between u(a, a) and u(a, x), he will choose the equilibrium strategy a. In a
symmetric equilibrium, the optimal x corresponds to the athlete’s own ability
a. Therefore, we insert x = a and p(x) = p(a) into the FOC and obtain
vG′(a)− cp′(a) = 0. The FOC states that the expected marginal return has to
be equal to the marginal costs of increasing the winning probability. Dividing
by c and solving for p′(a) gives p′(a) = vG′(a)/c. We see that only the ratio
of prize money to marginal doping costs matters. Therefore, we use w and
obtain the basic equation to derive the equilibrium performance function:
p′(a) = wG′(a). (5)
Our assumption of a linear doping cost function implies that an athlete with
ability ai is indifferent between his equilibrium performance p(ai) and all other
p(a)’s for which the nonnegativity constraint of doping is not binding.13
13This particular circumstance has to be kept in mind when we investigate the equilibrium
and for the proof of Theorem 1. If, instead, we used a doping cost function with slightly
decreasing marginal costs or a quadratic doping cost function, then the implied single cross-
ing property would guarantee a strictly separating equilibrium. For example, assume that
the doping cost function is: c(a) = c exp(−ρa), where ρ is very small. As ρ goes to zero the
marginal costs go to c (limρ→0 c(a) = c). Therefore, it seems plausible that the equilibrium
outcome in the limit is similar to the outcome of a linear doping cost function.
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Integrating from 0 to a gives the performance function p(a) for the cases
where the nonnegativity constraint is not binding.
p(a) = waα(n−1) for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. (6)
The equilibrium performance function is similar to an equilibrium bid function
of a standard all-pay auction.
Having specified the performance function for parameterizations where the
nonnegativity constraint is not binding, we now turn to parameterizations of
the leading case. Under these assumptions, the nonnegativity constraint is only
binding for weak abilities. If we use performance function (6) for cases where
the constraint is binding, then this would result in a performance function that
lies partly below the underlying ability.
Figure 2 depicts such a situation (α = 1, n = 10, w = 2). For athletes with
an ability lower than the intersection (0.92), the performance function lies
below the underlying ability. Hence, the nonnegativity constraint is violated.
One could argue that augmenting the performance function of the lower section
of the curve to the 45-degree line (to their corresponding ability) would solve
the problem. However, we will show below, that this is not a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 2: Optimization that neglects the nonnegativity constraint
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In the following, we will derive the equilibrium results of Theorem 1. To
ensure that an athlete’s performance is equal to or greater than his ability, we
introduce the reserve ability approach.14 This approach to find the equilibrium
subject to the nonnegativity constraint is non-standard in auction literature.
Therefore, we derive the equilibrium with the doping threshold step by step
and, if necessary, provide further explanations.
The reserve ability approach is a three-step procedure to find the equi-
librium outcome. First, assign an arbitrary reserve ability and assume that
athletes with abilities below the reserve ability choose their ability as per-
formance. Second, derive the equilibrium doping behavior of athletes with
abilities above the reserve ability. And finally, determine the proper reserve
ability such that athletes with abilities below it behave optimally. The ap-
proach can only be applied if the constraint is binding for a closed interval
that includes the lowest ability and the c.d.f. is continuous.
The introduction of the reserve ability approach ensures that the perfor-
mance of weak athletes is equal to their ability, such that p(a) is no longer
smaller than a. In contrast to an auction with a reserve price, weaker athletes
can still win, since their performance is the sum of the chosen doping quantity
and their ability. The reserve ability is non-effective under parameterizations
where the constraint is not binding and performance outstrips ability over the
whole support.
In order to obtain the performance function p(a) of an athlete with ability
a, we integrate Equation (5) from an arbitrary reserve ability ar with respect
to a. ∫ a
ar
p′(z)dz = w
∫ a
ar
G′(z)dz = w[F (a)n−1 − F (ar)n−1].
We solve the integral on the left-hand side of the equation above and take the
obtained term p(ar) over to the right-hand side. Since the performance func-
tion at position ar must be equal to ar, we can replace p(ar) by ar. Finally,
we substitute the power distribution function. We thus obtain the perfor-
mance function of athletes, given the underlying distribution of abilities and
14The term reserve ability comes from the concept of the reserve price. The reserve price is
used in auction theory in order to close out bid valuations that are too low. The bids have
to at least meet the reserve price, which prevents bidders with valuations lower than r from
placing a bid. For a good overview on auctions and the reserve price see Krishna (2002).
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the reserve ability ar.
p(a, ar) = ar+w
[
F (a)n−1 − F (ar)n−1
]
= ar+w[aα(n−1)−arα(n−1) ] for ar ≤ a ≤ 1.
(7)
The proper reserve ability satisfies two conditions. First, the reserve ability
ar has to be chosen such that the performance function p(a, ar) of athletes
with ability above the reserve ability does not sink below the 45-degree line
(p(a, ar) > a for a ∈ [ar, 1]). Second, ar must not be chosen too large such
that athletes with abilities below the reserve ability have no incentives to
deviate. For our continuous power distribution function, these two conditions
are satisfied if p(a, ar) has the same slope as the 45-degree line at position
a = ar. Hence, the slope of the performance function is equal to 1 at the
proper reserve ability, which we denote the doping threshold. The reason for
this smoothness condition can be seen in the athletes’ optimization problem. In
equilibrium, every athlete chooses his performance such that weaker athletes
have no interest in imitating that performance. Therefore, the equilibrium
performance function does not have a kink at the doping threshold.15
To determine the proper reserve ability ar, we set the derivative of the
performance function (7) equal to one. By solving the equation for a, we
obtain Equation (4) which is the doping threshold. The doping threshold a?
defines the ability level where the athlete is indifferent between doping and
not doping. Athletes with an ability beneath the threshold do not dope, and
athletes with an ability above this value take performance-enhancing drugs.
The doping threshold depends on the distribution of abilities, the number of
competing athletes, and the ratio of prize money to marginal doping costs. In
Proposition 2, we show that under the parameterization of the leading case
the doping threshold exists.
Proposition 2 If α(n− 1) > 1 and α(n− 1)w > 1, then there exists a unique
doping threshold a? ∈ (0, 1), and strong athletes dope, and weak athletes abstain
from doping.
Proof. The derivative of Equation (7) is continuous and strictly increasing
if α(n − 1) > 1. Given that ar = 0, the derivative pa(0, 0) is zero. If the
15For the mathematical proof see Appendix A.1.
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derivative pa(1, 0) = α(n − 1)w > 1, then it follows that a unique solution of
the doping threshold a? must exist over the support ∈ [0, 1].
The next step is to derive the performance function and the doping amount
of the athletes. The athlete’s performance function is obtained by inserting
Equation (4) in Equation (7). The result is Equation (3), which is the equi-
librium behavior of the athletes.
Besides the performance function, the doping behavior of the athletes is
of interest. As the performance function p(a) is the sum of ability a and
the doping quantity d, the doping function can be simply derived from the
performance function. The doping quantity is an athlete’s performance minus
his ability. Having determined the doping threshold, the performance function
and the doping quantity, we can now describe the equilibrium behavior of
athletes in the doping model. Section 4 will discuss the outcomes of the doping
model in more detail. Using comparative statics and figures, we will show how
different values of α, n and w influence the doping threshold, the performance
function and the doping function.
4 Discussion
In our model, athletes usually choose an amount of doping such that the
marginal costs of doping are equal to the marginal expected increase in prize
revenue. Depending on the distribution of abilities, however, it is possible that
the marginal return to be gained by doping is smaller than the marginal costs
of doping. In the leading case, weak athletes abstain from doping, because
it would cost more to imitate the performance of a slightly stronger athlete
than the extra return from having a higher probability of winning. Thus, we
identify a discouragement effect for weak athletes, similar to the discourage-
ment effect in Lazear-Rosen tournament models with head-starts or handicaps
(see e.g., Weigelt et al. (1989) and Schotter and Weigelt (1992)). Crucial for
an athlete’s doping decision is his actual ability and the shape of the winning
probability function G. The function becomes more convex, the more competi-
tors there are. This is the reason that a threshold value exists for the majority
of parameterizations, below which it is optimal to abstain from doping.
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4.1 The Number of Athletes and the Costs of Doping
In discussing the results, we first investigate the effects of n and w. For this, we
will assume that α = 1. The abilities are uniformly distributed between 0 and
1. First, we will consider the doping threshold. With a uniform distribution
of abilities, Equation (4) becomes
a?(α=1,n,w) = [w(n− 1)]
1
2−n . (8)
The number of competitors is decisive for the size of the doping threshold.
If only two athletes compete, then the function of the doping threshold does
not exist. In a two-player contest, the performance function consequently has
the following appearance: p(a) = wa for w > 1. The doping quantity, thus,
increases linearly in line with ability. If w ≤ 1, the two athletes do not dope,
because doping is too expensive. Hence, either both athletes dope or neither
dopes.
In contests with more than two athletes, a doping threshold does exist. An
athlete is indifferent between doping and not doping if his ability is equal to the
threshold. The more athletes participate, the higher the value of the doping
threshold. A higher number of participants makes it increasingly unattractive
for weak athletes to dope. Furthermore, the ratio of prize money to marginal
doping costs w determines the level of the doping threshold. If w is large,
then the participants can win a large amount of prize money and the doping
costs are relatively low. If w becomes smaller, that is, the relative doping costs
increase, then the doping threshold rises.
Figure 3 shows the performance function for a contest between 10 athletes
and a ratio of prize money to marginal doping costs of 2. The performance
function (thick line) represents an athlete’s ability up to the threshold. Beyond
this point, the athlete’s performance is greater than his ability. The doping
threshold lies at approximately 0.7. An athlete’s doping amount is the dif-
ference between his performance and his ability. Up to the doping threshold,
the doping amount is equal to zero. Doping does not pay in this array, and
athletes’ true abilities determine the outcome. For abilities above the doping
threshold, the doping function has a positive value. In other words, athletes
above this threshold will dope. The more talented such an athlete is, the more
Discussion 49
he will dope, so that the athlete with the greatest ability will dope the most.
Figure 3: Performance function p(a)
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Under standard parameterizations, an athlete will have difficulties winning
without resorting to doping. In order to illustrate this, we use the example of
an athlete with ability afair = 1. This athlete always wins in a world where
no athlete resorts to doping. However, if he decides not to dope, his chances
of winning falls dramatically. In order to calculate his chance of winning in
this contest, we need ability a◦, for which the performance function p(a◦) is
equal to 1.16 Our best athlete, who is also honest, is only able to win against
athletes whose a < a◦. His likelihood of winning corresponds to the highest
order statistic of a◦. G(afair = 1) = a◦ n−1 = 0.19. In a doping environment,
his chance of winning thus falls from 100 percent to just 20 percent. This low
winning probability is due to the fact that he does not simply have to compete
against one competitor whose ability should be smaller than his (ai < a◦), but
has to win against all nine competitors.
Commercialization has caused prize money in certain sports to surge and
has allowed successful athletes to skim additional cash from private companies.
16We set the performance function equal to 1 and then solve for a. For the contest with n = 10
and w = 2 we get: a◦ = 0.832.
50 Chapter 2: The Doping Threshold in Sport Contests
Nowadays, it is quite common, that companies employ the images of successful
athletes in corporate sponsoring events to position a brand or to ameliorate
their images. Thus, the ratio w seems to have increased rather than decreased
over the last two decades. In our model, a larger w leads to a smaller doping
threshold and raises the amount of doping substances used. The implications
of our model are supported by the observation that there are more doping
cases in popular sports than in sports where the prize amount is lower, or
where doping offers only a small competitive advantage.
4.2 The Distribution of Abilities
The nature of the distribution affects the doping threshold and the equilibrium
amount of doping substances used. The power distribution with an arbitrary
α illustrates different distributions of abilities. For α < 1, the density of the
ability distribution is the highest for small a’s, while on the other hand for
α > 1, there are relatively more strong than weak athletes. We accentuate
the importance of the distribution of abilities by contrasting the outcome of a
contest of numerous strong athletes with the outcome of a contest of numerous
weak athletes.
Figure 4 compares two different distributions of abilities. In both cases, 10
athletes compete against each other, and the ratio of prize money to marginal
doping costs is equal to 2. The dashed line is the density of athletes’ abilities.
In Graph (a), the density of the power function distribution has a parameter
value of α = 0.3, and in Graph (b) it has one of α = 3. The thin line is the
performance of the athletes when they do not dope. The athlete’s behavior–
when doping takes place–is illustrated by the performance function.
Graph (a) illustrates the outcome of a contest with numerous weak athletes.
Here, the doping threshold is very low. Since there are only a few strong
athletes, even relatively weak athletes make use of doping. The explanation
for this result is that the probability of coming up against a stronger athlete
in the contest is relatively small. With a low probability of strong athletes,
the performance function increases gradually.
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Figure 4: Comparison of different distributions
(a) Many weak contestants: α = 0.3
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(b) Many strong contestants: α = 3
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Graph (b) illustrates the outcome of a contest with numerous strong ath-
letes. Here, doping behavior is quite different in comparison to the first case.
The doping threshold is higher. This is because a weak athlete can expect to
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come up against a stronger competitor, given the higher probability of strong
athletes. The performance function increases much more sharply than it did
in Graph (a). The reason is that the degree of competition is more intense
among strong athletes. This leads the strongest athlete to take more doping
substances than he would have in the first case. In Graph (a), the performance
of the strongest athlete is 2.2, while it is above 2.6 in Graph (b). Hence, al-
though the doping threshold is further to the right, the actual performance of
an athlete with a = 1 is greater than in a contest with numerous weak athletes.
This section shows that in addition to the number of athletes and the ratio
of prize money to marginal doping costs, the distribution of abilities also plays a
significant role. An athlete’s strength relative to his opponents and, as in Dilger
and Tolsdorf (2010), the competitive pressure which weighs on an athlete from
competitors with similar abilities are crucial for the doping decision. However,
note that a high doping threshold does not always imply that strong athletes
dope less than in circumstances with a lower doping threshold. In summary,
competitive pressure and the distribution of abilities play decisive roles in an
athlete’s choice of the optimal doping quantity.
4.3 Special Cases
All parameter values for α, n and w that meet the assumptions of the leading
case lead to an equilibrium outcome where weak athletes abstain from doping.
Relaxing the conditions of the distribution of abilities and allowing for extreme
values of the ratio of prize money to doping costs makes three other outcomes
possible. The leading case arises in the majority of underlying parameter val-
ues. The other three cases are special cases that emerge only under exceptional
circumstances: if doping costs are very high or low, or if the distribution of
abilities is extremely skewed to the left.
For the prevailing equilibrium outcome, the derivative of Equation (7) with
respect to a plays a central role. The derivative is the expected marginal gain
divided by the marginal costs of doping. The second derivative shows that the
first derivative is increasing if α(n − 1) > 1 and decreasing if α(n − 1) < 1
for every a ∈ (0, 1]. This critical value is the key to distinguish between the
different doping outcomes. The underlying parameter values of α, n and w
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determine which outcome arises. Three additional outcomes are possible. In
the first case, no athlete dopes. In the second case, only weak athletes dope.
And in the third case, everybody dopes.17
The outcome that nobody dopes results if the ratio of prize money to
marginal doping costs is low in comparison to the product of the shape pa-
rameter and the number of rivals. Nobody dopes because the marginal doping
costs are greater than the marginal increase in the expected return. Hence,
everybody would lower his expected utility by doping.
Proposition 3 If α(n− 1) ≥ 1 and α(n− 1)w ≤ 1, then no doping threshold
a? ∈ [0, 1] exists and nobody dopes.
Proof. The derivative of Equation (7) with respect to a at ar = a is
continuous and strictly increasing in a if α(n−1) > 1. The derivative at a = 0
is zero. If the derivative p′1(1, 1) = α(n − 1)w < 1, then it follows that no
doping threshold a? exists over the support [0, 1].
The two other outcomes arise when the distribution of abilities is highly
skewed to the left. In case (ii) only weak athletes dope, and in case (iii) every-
body dopes. We investigate equilibrium outcomes for distributions of abilities
that satisfy the inequality α(n− 1) < 1. Then, the derivative of Equation (7)
is decreasing. Furthermore, p1(0, ar) is not defined under this condition. It is
the case that lima→0 p1(a, ar) =∞. Therefore, the nonnegativity constraint is
not binding for small a’s. Depending on the underlying parameter values, it is
possible that the constraint is not binding over the whole support. In such a
case, the equilibrium performance function is Equation (6). Generalizing the
performance function in such a way that it displays the equilibrium outcomes
of case (ii) and (iii), gives
p(a) = max{waα(n−1), a} for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. (9)
The doping quantity is the difference between an athlete’s performance and
his ability. In the equilibrium outcome, only weak athletes take performance-
enhancing drugs. The formula of the doping threshold in case (ii) differs from
17Appendix A.2 presents the conditions, the parameter values have to meet for each of the
three special cases.
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the leading case. The doping threshold in case (ii) is given as follows:
a?α,n,w = w
1
1−α(n−1) . (10)
Proposition 4 presents the outcome of case (ii) and (iii) and the underlying
conditions.
Proposition 4 If α(n − 1) < 1, then two doping outcomes are possible, de-
pending on the underlying value of w. In the first outcome (ii), only weak
athletes dope. If w ≤ 1, then there exists a unique doping threshold a? ∈ [0, 1]
and only weak athletes have an incentive to dope.
In the second outcome (iii), everybody dopes. If w > 1, then no doping thresh-
old exists over the support [0, 1], and every athlete has an incentive to dope.
Proof. If α(n − 1) < 1, then the derivative of Equation (7) with respect to
a for ar = 0 is strictly decreasing in a. Furthermore, the derivative p1(0, ar) is
not defined. It can be shown that lima→0 p1(a, ar) =∞. First, consider special
case (ii). The performance function p(a, 0) at a = 1, not considering the doping
nonnegativity constraint, would be p(1, 0) = w1α(n−1) = w ≤ 1. Therefore,
there exists a unique intersection point with the 45-degree line. Hence, there
exists a doping threshold a? over the support ∈ [0, 1].
Using the same reasoning for special case (iii), no doping threshold exists over
the support [0, 1] if w > 1.
Figure 5 displays the performance function p(a) in the special case (ii).
The dashed line is the density distribution of abilities. The distribution is
very skewed to the left, which implies that mostly weak athletes compete in
the contest. Ten athletes participate in the contest, and the ratio of prize
money to marginal doping costs is assumed to be 2. The equilibrium outcome
is that weak athletes dope. The doping amount starts to decrease after a
certain ability level and is zero for abilities above the doping threshold. The
reason for this outcome is that the degree of competition is greatest for weak
abilities. Strong athletes do not dope, because the probability of encountering
a stronger athlete and the ratio of prize money to marginal doping costs are
so small that it is not optimal to increase their performance over their ability
level under private information.
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Figure 5: Weak athletes dope, special case (ii)
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Case HiiL: Only weak athletes dope
At the doping threshold, the performance function has a kink. Having
argued in the leading case that there can be no kink at the doping threshold,
in the special case (ii) this is different. Given that all other athletes play
the symmetric equilibrium of the performance function in Equation (9), it
can be shown that an athlete with an ability ai below the doping threshold is
indifferent to imitating the performance of an athlete with an ability aj < a?. If
he would instead imitate the performance of an athlete with an ability aj > a?,
his utility decreases. For athletes with an ability above the doping threshold
the nonnegativity constraint is binding. This implies that the marginal return
of increasing the performance is lower than the marginal costs of doping.
5 Conclusion
We study the doping behavior in an environment of heterogeneous agents and
private information. Our setting yields new insights which complement exist-
ing results of the doping literature. For the majority of underlying parameter
values a doping threshold exists. In our leading case, weak athletes will ab-
stain from doping even without doping controls. Athletes with abilities above
the doping threshold resort to doping substances. The doping behavior of
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athletes and the level of the doping threshold are sensitive to the underlying
parameterization. Three other equilibrium outcomes occur when we investi-
gate nonstandard parameterizations. In this paper, we restrict our attention
to doping in sport contests. However, our private information setting may also
be of interest in areas such as promotion tournaments or public procurement.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, an athlete’s doping
decision depends on the ratio of prize money to marginal doping costs and not
on absolute values. In the doping model, a higher ratio decreases the doping
threshold and more athletes dope. Thus, the ongoing commercialization and
new discoveries of the pharmaceutical industry have increased the incentives
to resort to doping. Second, increasing the number of athletes affects the
doping decision in two ways. The increased competition forces strong athletes
to take larger amounts of drugs. At the same time a discouragement effect
exists for weak athletes. The anticipation of facing a higher probability of
encountering stronger athletes discourages weak athletes from doping. Finally,
our comparison of outcomes between a contest with many weak athletes and
a contest with many strong athletes shows that competitive pressure and the
distribution of abilities play decisive roles in athletes’ doping behavior.
The results of our model would be even more convincing if we could test
our findings empirically. Unfortunately, hardly any empirical studies about
doping exist, since doping is not directly observable. However, there are in-
dications that support our findings. Empirical evidence shows that there are
more positive doping cases in commercial sports with high prize amounts and
where athletes receive substantial payments from sponsorships. On the other
hand, doping is only rarely detected in technical sports such as tennis, where
the use of performance-enhancing drugs helps only marginally.
A promising extension of our model would be the inclusion of a regulator
who checks the pool of athletes. But, such a model that combines our private
information setting with the asymmetric information problem between athletes
and the regulator would be demanding. This is because we would have to
incorporate disqualifications into our model, which makes closed-form solutions
impossible.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The equilibrium performance function (Equation (3)) with the doping thresh-
old (Equation (4)) is a Nash equilibrium if no athlete with ability ai for all
ai ∈ [0, 1] is better off by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium strategy.
Note that the performance function is strictly increasing in a. It follows that, if
an athlete imitates the strategy of an athlete with ability aj, his winning prob-
ability is G(aj). By using the term imitating, we mean that the athlete choses
the performance p(aj) of an athlete with ability aj. Note that an athlete with
ability ai can only imitate athletes with a performance greater than his ability
(p(aj) ≥ ai). Thus, we can limit the verification on the range p(aj) ≥ ai, for
all ai ∈ [0, 1].
Before starting with the proof, we ask the question: How large would the
doping costs have to be for an athlete with ability ai to win with probability
G(aj), such that he would be indifferent to his equilibrium strategy? An athlete
is indifferent if the difference of the winning probability times prize money is
equal to the difference of doping costs. We denote the performance level where
the athlete would be indifferent by pˆai(G(aj)). The performance level satisfies
the following equation:
vG(aj)− c(pˆai(G(aj))− ai) = vG(ai)− c(p(ai)− ai). (11)
Generalizing Equation (11) for an arbitrary a ≥ ai gives an indifference func-
tion.
Definition 2 The indifference function pˆai(a) indicates the performance level
at which an athlete with ability ai is indifferent to his equilibrium strategy p(ai)
if he were to win with the probability of an athlete with ability a. Function pˆai(a)
is defined in the range a ∈ [ai, 1]. More formally the function is
pˆai(a) = p(ai)+w[G(a)−G(ai)] = p(ai)+w[aα(n−1)−aα(n−1)i ] for a ≥ ai. (12)
Comparing the functional form of Equation (12) with Equation (7) shows that
the only difference is the threshold value. For abilities ai > a?, the indifference
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function is even identical to the equilibrium performance function within the
range of a ∈ [a?, 1]. This is a direct result of the assumed linear doping cost
function. The indifference function illustrates whether an athlete would have
an interest in deviating from the equilibrium. If the performance function
p(a) runs below (above) pˆai(a), then the athlete is better off (worse off) by
deviating. The proof of Theorem 1 consists of two steps. First, we prove that
the performance function is a Nash equilibrium ((i), (ii)). Second, we prove
that the doping threshold a? is unique.
Proof. For athletes with ability ai above the doping threshold, the indif-
ference function is identical to the performance function. (i) Hence, for all
ai ∈ [a?, 1] no athlete can be better off by imitating another performance
(p(aj) ≥ ai).
For athletes with abilities ai < a? below the doping threshold, the indif-
ference function is not identical to the performance function. Note that the
derivative with respect to a of pˆai(a) is equal to the derivative of Equation (7).
For parameterizations of the leading case, the derivative pˆai ′(a) at a = ai is
strictly increasing in ai. Remember that pˆai(a) for ai = a? is identical to the
performance function. Therefore, the derivative of pˆai(a) at a = a? is equal to
1. (ii) This implies that pˆai(a) runs below the performance function p(a) in
the range of t ∈ [ai, 1] for all ai ∈ [0, a?). Hence, an athlete with ability ai is
worse off by imitating the strategy of an ability a > ai.
Finally, we prove that the doping threshold a? is unique. Suppose that the
optimal threshold a˜? is smaller than a?. Then, the performance function would
violate the nonnegativity constraint, since the derivative of the performance
function is smaller than 1 for all a˜? ∈ [0, a?). Now suppose that the optimal
threshold a˜? is greater than a?. Then, pˆai(a) of an athlete with ability ai which
is slightly smaller than a˜? would run above the performance function, since the
derivative of pˆai(ai) for ai ∈ (a?, 1] is greater than 1. Hence, the athlete with
ability a˜? −  would be better off by deviating from his equilibrium strategy.
It follows that the doping threshold a? is optimally chosen, and therefore the
performance function is a Nash equilibrium.
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A.2 The Four Doping Outcomes
The following description presents the different doping outcomes. Moreover,
the conditions on the parameterization values of α, n and w that lead to the
four outcomes are displayed.
Table 1: The doping outcomes
(A) Leading Case (B) Special Cases
(i) Nobody dopes
α ≥ (n− 1)−1 ∩ wα(n− 1) ≤ 1.
Strong athletes dope (ii) Weak athletes dope
α ≥ (n− 1)−1 ∩ wα(n− 1) > 1. α < (n− 1)−1 ∩ w ≤ 1.
(iii) Everybody dopes
α < (n− 1)−1 ∩ w > 1.
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Abstract
Switzerland’s energy policy is faced by unseen challenges owing to the sched-
uled nuclear phaseout and the continuation of the Kyoto protocol. As a small
open economy, effects of unilateral energy policies on manufacturing industries
may be especially relevant for Switzerland. However, estimates of sectoral sub-
stitution elasticities between input factors used to address important questions
in this context do not exist for Swiss manufacturing. We close this gap by us-
ing a newly assembled data set covering the period from 1997 to 2008 and by
estimating substitution elasticities employing a translog cost function. More-
over, we examine the implications of energy price increases putting emphasis
on the input mix in Swiss manufacturing industries.
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1 Introduction
In 2011, shortly after the incident in Fukushima, the Swiss government and
parliament have decided to aim for a nuclear phaseout. At the end of 2012, the
Swiss government has furthermore prolonged the reduction targets for green-
house gas emissions until the year 2020. Only few countries have conclusively
decided to abandon nuclear energy production and many countries around
the world have not ratified the Kyoto protocol. Switzerland is therefore faced
with energy policy challenges unmatched by other countries. The dimension of
these challenges is even intensified by the fact that Switzerland, as a small open
economy, is highly integrated into the world economy, and that manufacturing
exports are one of the cornerstones of Swiss prosperity. Hence, the effects of
policy measures largely depends on whether similar measures are implemented
in other countries.
The actual implementation of policy instruments aimed at achieving these
goals is still rather unclear which makes it hard to assess possible consequences
for the Swiss economy in detail. However, the implied future policy adjust-
ments are sure to yield important effects on the demand and the supply side
of the energy provision in Switzerland, changing absolute and relative prices of
different energy sources and other input factors. Specifically, price increases of
oil, fuel or electricity, as they are already announced by the government, will
reduce the demand for energy. They will also change the demand for other
input factors like labor, capital or material, in turn causing adjustments of the
relative use of these inputs.
Elasticities of substitution between input factors measure these adjust-
ments in the input mix of firms and are, therefore, important inputs for policy
analysis and forecasting. Such elasticities have been estimated abundantly
and the empirical literature has shown that the magnitude of these elasticities
depends on a variety of factors. Importantly, these findings indicate that elas-
ticities vary significantly between countries, industries and time periods. It is
hence essential that policy evaluations are based on elasticities that are repre-
sentative for the situation at hand. However, such elasticities of substitution
between input factors covering recent years have not been estimated for Swiss
manufacturing at a sectoral level, the reason being a lack of data availability.
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Switzerland is now in a situation where it is of paramount importance to
obtain a better understanding of how manufacturing firms adjust their behav-
ior upon relative changes of factor prices. In this article, we address this issue
and estimate sectoral elasticities of substitution between energy, capital, labor
and material inputs for Swiss manufacturing covering the period from 1997
to 2008. We evaluate how the substitutability between input factors actually
works in firms of different industries and focus on how energy price increases
affect the input mix and production costs of manufacturing industries.
The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, employing a
translog cost function, we present estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities
(CPE) as well as Morishima elasticities of substitution (MES) using a newly
assembled data set on Swiss manufacturing industries. We observe that labor
and capital are estimated as CPE substitutes in most industries, while the
evidence is mixed regarding the substitution pattern regarding energy and
capital and particularly regarding energy and labor. All factor inputs are
estimated as being MES substitutes. Standard errors of some estimates are,
however, relatively large.
Second, and to obtain more precise estimates, we provide a pooled regres-
sion using Swiss data as well as additional data on nine high-income OECD
countries with economic attributes similar to Switzerland. Standard errors
decrease substantially and we observe elasticities of smaller magnitude. The
substitution patterns remain similar to the case using Swiss data only, as
capital and labor are still estimated as substitutes, while evidence on the sub-
stitutability of labor and energy as well as capital and energy is mixed and
sector heterogeneity remains substantial. Again, all inputs tend to be MES
substitutes with very few exceptions.
Third, we compare our results with results of recent contributions from the
elasticity literature, concentrating on the substitutability versus complemen-
tarity debate. Estimated substitution patterns are generally similar to other
studies. However, sectoral heterogeneity is substantial and hence, individual
sector results may largely differ in comparison to studies analyzing other coun-
tries or time periods.
Fourth, we show how an increase of the price of energy affects the input
mix of manufacturing industries by interpreting the estimated CPE and MES.
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Again, sector heterogeneity is large, but in an average manufacturing firm,
energy price increases lead to a reduction in labor expenses and an increase
of material and especially of capital expenses. The manufacturing-wide reduc-
tion of labor expenses upon price increases of energy and its compensation by
capital and material inputs is one important take-away of our contribution.
We also show that in a typical firm, the physical use ratios of energy relative
to the use of the other factors decrease. However, due to the inelastic nature
of energy own-price elasticities in the more reliable OECD regressions, the cost
ratios of energy relative to the other factors increase on average.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
discuss the theoretical model employed and illustrate how economic elastici-
ties are calculated. In Section 3, we provide an overview of the data set and
present the estimation strategy. Section 4 discusses the regression results and
illustrates the substitution patterns of manufacturing sectors. In Section 5, we
analyze how energy price increases affect the input mix and costs of manufac-
turing industries and discuss policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modeling Approach
We assume an industry-specific production technology with input factors cap-
ital (K), labor (L), energy (E), and material (M), its cost function taking the
form of a transcendental logarithmic (translog) function. The translog cost
function was proposed in Christensen et al. (1973) and subsequently adopted
in a seminal paper by Berndt and Christensen (1973) to estimate the substi-
tution patterns in U.S. manufacturing. Since it does not impose any prior
constraints on the elasticities and on the optimal path of input factor adjust-
ments, it is one of the preferred functional forms used in the literature.1
It embodies the following important implications for parameterization. First,
the sum of the factor shares equals one in every sector, and second, symmetry
of the cross-price derivatives must be satisfied (βij = βji for i, j = 1, .., I). The
1It is standard to estimate elasticities from the translog model using cost functions instead of
production functions. One reason for this approach is that no arbitrary restrictions of the
production patterns have to be assumed (Jorgenson, 1986). Another reason is that the data
requirements are less rigorous than for estimating production functions, since cost functions
only require data on factor shares and factor unit prices.
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first property induces singularity, because the sum of the error terms of the
four factor shares has to equal zero for every sector. We obtain a non-singular
system by normalizing the price of material which allows us to omit the factor
share equation of this input.2 The second property is satisfied by imposing
constraints directly on the regression equation (see Section 3). Furthermore,
we note that the necessary concavity properties are not generally met using
translog cost functions. We test for this property in Section 4.
The factor share equations can be obtained by differentiating the logarithm
of the translog cost function with respect to the logarithm of the prices and
are given by
sin,t = βin +
∑
j
βijn ln(pjn,t) + βiny ln yn,t + βin,tt, (1)
where i and j are indices for input factors, n is the industry index and t is a
time index. Factor share sin,t of input i in industry n thus equals the sum of a
constant βin and the own-price and cross-price derivatives βijn (also referred to
as share elasticities) multiplied by the logarithm of the input prices. Moreover,
we add the logarithm of output yn,t and a time trend t. The coefficient βiny
allows for various forms of returns to scale, and the time trend parameter βin,t
additionally permits us to account for non-neutral technological change.
Three types of economic elasticities derived from the estimates of βijn are
commonly used in the literature: the cross-price elasticity, the Morishima elas-
ticity of substitution and the Allen partial elasticity of substitution (AES)
which is a normalized version of the CPE. We refrain from calculating AES,
as it has been argued by many scholars that they do not yield any useful
interpretation in the case of more than two input factors.3
The CPExi,pj , measures the relative change in quantity xi of a production
factor i due to the relative price change in pj of a factor j. In the remain-
der of the paper, we denote such elasticities by CPEij, where the first index
indicates the factor whose quantity is affected, and the second one the factor
experiencing the initial price change. These elasticities can be derived from
2The elasticities of the input factor material can be derived by using the imposed restrictions.
3See for example Thompson and Taylor (1995), Blackorby and Russell (1989) or Frondel
(2011).
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the estimated share elasticities (βij) and the observed factor shares as follows:4
CPEij ≡ ∂ ln xi
∂ ln pj
=
βˆij + sisj
si
, CPEii ≡ ∂ ln xi
∂ ln pi
= βˆii + sisi − si
si
, (2)
where the second expression is used to calculate the own-price elasticities.
The MESxi/xj ,pj measures the relative change in the quantity ratio xi/xj
of production factors i, j due to a relative price change in pj of factor j. We
denote these elasticities by MESij. To obtain the MES, the own-price elasticity
is subtracted from the CPE as follows,
MESij ≡ ∂ ln(xi/xj)
∂ ln pj
= CPEij − CPEjj. (3)
Following Koetse et al. (2008), the standard errors of the elasticities can be
derived by using the Delta Method (see Appendix A.1).
Using Equation (3) and remembering that the own-price elasticity is always
negative, it follows that MESij > CPEij. The MES primarily indicates how
factor intensities in production change upon price increases. Moreover, the
MES can also be used to assess the change in the relative cost shares between
two factors i and j upon a price increase in factor j:
∂ ln(pixi/pjxj)
∂ ln pj
= ∂ ln(pixi)
∂ ln pj
− ∂ ln(pjxj)
∂ ln pj
= ∂ ln xi
∂ ln pj
− 1− ∂ ln xj
∂ ln pj
(4)
= CPEij − CPEjj − 1 = MESij − 1,
where pixi/
∑
k pkxk = si. Hence, the share ratio si/sj increases in pj if
MESij > 1.
3 Data and Estimation Strategy
We use industry-specific data containing information on cost shares, prices and
deflators of the input factors capital, labor, energy and material, as well as on
4Anderson and Thursby (1986) argue in favor of using the means of factor shares, since this
provides desirable properties regarding the distribution of the elasticity estimators. We omit
the industry index n for brevity’s sake. As si and sj we use factor share averages computed
over the full time span of our analysis, see Table 2.
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Table 1: Definition of manufacturing industries
Aggregates
(industriesa) Description (Short name)
1 (15,16) Food products and beverages (Food)
2 (17,18,19)Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (Textiles)
3 (20) Wood and products of wood and cork (Wood)
4 (21,22) Pulp, paper products, printing and publishing (Pulp, paper)
5 (24) Chemicals and chemical products (Chemicals)
6 (25) Rubber and plastic products (Rubber, plastics)
7 (26) Other non-metallic mineral products (Other non-metals)
8 (27,28) Basic metals and fabricated metal products (Metals)
9 (29) Machinery and equipment (Machinery)
10 (30,...,33) Electrical and optical equipment (Electrical equip.)
11 (34,35) Transport equipment (Transport equip.)
Notes: a Industries according to NOGA 2002 industrial classification of Switzerland, 2-digit.
revenue and production, covering Swiss manufacturing sectors for the period
1997–2008. To increase the sample size, we also estimate a specification where
we pool across countries using additional data on nine OECD countries from
1995 to 2005, i.e., from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The Swiss Federal Statistical
Office (SFSO) and the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) are the main
sources of the data on Swiss manufacturing industries. Data for the other
countries stem from the database EU KLEMS.5 All data are generally available
at the ISIC 3.1 2-digit level. While this classification defines 23 manufacturing
industries, we aggregate these ISIC industries into 11 industries due to data
limitations.6 Table 1 provides an overview of these industries.
Table 2 displays the average cost shares of capital, labor, energy and ma-
terial in Swiss manufacturing industries. In addition, averages over the full
country sample, labeled OECD, is displayed. While average factor shares in
Switzerland are of similar magnitude, we note that labor and material shares
5An extensive description of the KLEMS database can be found in Timmer et al. (2007) and
O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
6We exclude ISIC sectors 23 (manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products), 36 (furni-
ture and other manufacturing) and 37 (recycling) due to the lack of data availability in
Switzerland.
70 Chapter 3: Energy Policy Challenges and the Input Mix
Table 2: Average input cost shares
Capital Labor Energy Material
Industry CHE OECD CHE OECD CHEOECD CHE OECD
1 Food 18.6% 25.4% 17.7% 16.5% 1.4% 1.8% 62.3% 56.3%
2 Textiles 18.9% 23.3% 30.0% 27.1% 1.8% 2.0% 49.3% 47.5%
3 Wood 20.5% 24.0% 33.6% 26.0% 1.3% 2.8% 44.5% 47.2%
4 Pulp, paper 24.7% 31.4% 34.4% 27.1% 3.5% 2.6% 37.5% 38.9%
5 Chemicals 35.7% 37.2% 16.7% 17.1% 1.5% 5.2% 46.1% 40.5%
6 Rubber, plastics 21.5% 26.8% 28.4% 25.9% 1.4% 3.1% 48.7% 44.3%
7 Other non-metals 25.2% 32.0% 29.7% 27.1% 4.5% 6.1% 40.6% 34.7%
8 Metals 22.4% 23.4% 34.3% 26.5% 2.3% 3.6% 41.0% 46.5%
9 Machinery 19.7% 24.8% 28.7% 27.4% 0.6% 1.2% 51.0% 46.5%
10 Electrical equipm. 25.8% 28.0% 26.2% 24.5% 0.8% 1.1% 47.2% 46.5%
11 Transport equipm.16.7% 20.0% 28.6% 19.5% 1.4% 1.1% 53.2% 59.5%
Notes: Swiss average shares are contrasted with the overall OECD average shares including data from
Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and Swe-
den.
are mostly above the OECD average, while capital and energy intensities are
slightly below. This pattern is quite intuitive given the high labor costs of
skill-intensive production and the relatively low capital costs in Switzerland.
Section A.2 in the Appendix describes the data in more detail.7
To estimate the share elasticities of the translog cost functions as in Equa-
tion (1), we use a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach to take the
cross-correlations between the error terms (covariance of the disturbances) in
the system of factor share equations into account. If the error terms are corre-
lated, SUR provides more efficient estimates than separate OLS estimation.8
We directly impose the symmetry restrictions on the estimation procedure
by setting up constraints in the form of βij = βji. Furthermore, we estimate
different specifications using present and lagged values of input prices to ac-
7Furthermore, detailed description of the Swiss data set can be found in Mohler and Müller
(2011) and Mohler and Müller (2012). These SFOE reports are available on http://www.ewg-
bfe.ch.
8Due to the limited number of time-series observations, we are not able to estimate the
coefficients simultaneously for all industries of Swiss manufacturing. However, we are still
able to estimate the three share equations of each industry in one step. In the pooled
regression, we estimate all share equations of all industries simultaneously.
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count for inertia in the adjustment process of the input factors as well as for
endogeneity issues. We find that the concavity property (also see next section)
is best met when using a one-year lag, and we therefore use this specification
in the present paper. In the pooled specification, we additionally add country
fixed effects to achieve results that are comparable to the Swiss estimates.9
4 Results
We first present the sectoral estimates for Swiss manufacturing before dis-
cussing the pooled OECD regressions. CPE and MES for labor, capital and
energy are discussed in turn.10 Key statistics of the estimations are shown in
Appendix A.4.
4.1 Estimates from Swiss Data
Table 3 displays own-price elasticities for manufacturing industries in Switzer-
land. Well-behaved production functions have to satisfy the concavity prop-
erty, i.e., own-price elasticities are required to be negative. The table illustrates
that while there is one positive point estimate of the labor own-price elastici-
ties, it is not significantly different from zero and hence the concavity property
is met.
To make an example regarding the interpretation of these elasticities, the
own-price elasticity of energy (-1.20) in industry 4, pulp and paper, implies that
an energy price increase of one percent induces the quantity of energy utilized
9It has been argued that pooling across countries yield long-run elasticities–since a substan-
tial part of cross-section differences may stand for long-term disparities between countries–
whereas time-series data yield short-run elasticities, see for example Griffin and Gregory
(1976), Berndt and Wood (1979), Griffin (1981) or Berndt and Wood (1981). However,
this argument is very controversial, i.e., it is questioned, whether cross-section differences
really are a manifestation of long-run effects, see Apostolakis (1990) for a detailed overview.
Hence, to compare the pooled results to the Swiss estimates, we include country fixed effects
in the pooled regression to prevent the factor share coefficients from taking on cross-section
effects and concentrate on the time-series variation.
10We refrain from presenting elasticities concerning the factor material. The inclusion of
materials into the modeling approach is nonetheless very important to omit biased results
for the other inputs as is shown by Berndt and Wood (1979).
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to produce a constant amount of output to decrease by 1.20 percent. Since the
own-price elasticity is smaller than -1, not only the quantity but also the cost
share of this factor will decrease upon a price increase. We also observe that
the energy elasticities are in most cases not found to be significantly different
from zero. This is also illustrated by Figure 1 in the Appendix.
Table 3: Own-price elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries
Industry CPELL CPEKK CPEEE
1 Food 0.02 -0.78* -1.15
(0.45) (0.25) (1.21)
2 Textilesa -0.25 -0.51 -2.23*
(0.65) (0.71) (0.37)
3 Wood -1.58 -1.14* -3.18
(0.82) (0.54) (3.49)
4 Pulp, papera -0.84* -1.47 -1.20*
(0.09) (1.04) (0.55)
5 Chemicals -1.83* -0.65* -1.42
(0.31) (0.26) (1.41)
6 Rubber, plasticsa -1.08* -0.38 -1.37
(0.26) (0.23) (1.88)
7 Other non-metals -1.87* -0.75* -1.29
(0.34) (0.33) (0.87)
8 Metals -1.30* -1.31* -0.87
(0.13) (0.16) (1.65)
9 Machinerya -1.06* -1.29* -0.27
(0.17) (0.55) (2.85)
10 Electrical equipm. -0.92* -1.55* -0.86
(0.16) (0.30) (1.47)
11 Transport equipm.a -1.62* -0.91 -0.29
(0.34) (0.98) (3.44)
Concavity Test:
Negativeb 10 (8) 11 (7) 11 (2)
Positiveb 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Notes: Swiss sectoral data. Asymptotic standard errors derived with
the delta method. ∗ Indicates significance at the 5% level. a Specifica-
tion contains employment as a control variable. b Number of significant
estimates in parentheses.
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Table 4 displays all six CPE between the input factors capital, labor and
energy. Considering industry 1, food products, the CPE that evaluates the
impact of an energy price change on labor use, CPELE (-0.20), indicates that if
energy prices increase by one percent, the quantity of labor utilized to produce
the constant amount of output will decrease by 0.2 percent. As expected, elas-
Table 4: Cross-price elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries
Industry CPELE CPEEL CPEKE CPEEK CPEKL CPELK
1 Food -0.20 -2.51 0.10 1.30 0.54* 0.57*
(0.15) (1.87) (0.10) (1.36) (0.17) (0.18)
2 Textilesa -0.01 -0.15 0.20* 2.09* 0.15 0.10
(0.06) (1.02) (0.07) (0.72) (0.59) (0.37)
3 Wood 0.14 3.62 0.17 2.57 0.23 0.14
(0.20) (5.12) (0.24) (3.73) (0.72) (0.44)
4 Pulp, papera 0.01 0.06 0.16 1.17 1.48* 1.06*
(0.04) (0.39) (0.18) (1.28) (0.26) (0.18)
5 Chemicals -0.08 -0.94 0.05 1.09 0.30* 0.65*
(0.13) (1.41) (0.06) (1.38) (0.12) (0.25)
6 Rubber, plasticsa 0.11 2.32 -0.01 -0.21 0.49* 0.37*
(0.10) (2.02) (0.13) (1.97) (0.20) (0.15)
7 Other non-metals 0.21 1.38 0.11 0.60 1.63* 1.39*
(0.16) (1.04) (0.18) (1.04) (0.25) (0.21)
8 Metals 0.09 1.34 0.03 0.25 1.11* 0.73*
(0.07) (1.10) (0.10) (0.98) (0.14) (0.09)
9 Machinerya 0.05 2.38 -0.00 -0.09 1.13* 0.78*
(0.07) (3.47) (0.11) (3.78) (0.25) (0.17)
10 Electrical equipm. -0.12 -3.97 0.04 1.17 0.74* 0.73*
(0.07) (2.35) (0.04) (1.32) (0.08) (0.08)
11 Transport equipm.a -0.08 -1.66 -0.22 -2.56 -0.61 -0.36
(0.16) (3.18) (0.31) (3.64) (0.61) (0.36)
Substitutes or Complements:
Substitutesb 6 (0) 6 (0) 8 (1) 8 (1) 10 (8) 10 (8)
Complementsb 5 (0) 5 (0) 3 (0) 3 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0)
Notes: Swiss sectoral data. Asymptotic standard errors derived with the delta method. ∗ Indicates
significance at the 5% level. a Specification contains employment as a control variable. b Number of
significant estimates in parentheses.
74 Chapter 3: Energy Policy Challenges and the Input Mix
ticities that evaluate the effect of energy price changes (columns one and three)
are generally small in magnitude due to the relatively small energy share in
production, while relative price changes of more important input factors yield
a larger impact on the use of other factors.
Interpreting all point estimates, while elasticities between capital and labor
as well as between energy and capital give some evidence for the substitutabil-
ity of these factors, the picture is less clear regarding energy and labor inputs.
Table 4 also reveals that the standard errors of the estimates are relatively
large (also see Figure 2 in the Appendix), and most elasticities that are signif-
icantly different from zero are found in the last two columns, between capital
and labor.
Analogously, Table 5 displays the MES. As these state how the ratio of
two input quantities changes due to a price change of the factor in the de-
nominator, a reading example shows that the energy-labor MES in industry 1,
MESLE (0.95), implies that an energy price change of one percent leads to an
increase of the labor-energy quantity ratio of 0.95 percent. It is furthermore
noteworthy that most MES are positive, implying substitutability between all
input factors. Again, the standard errors are relatively large, except for the
elasticities in the last two columns of the table. Figure 3 in the Appendix
visualizes the corresponding confidence intervals.
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Table 5: Morishima elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries
Industry MESLE MESEL MESKE MESEK MESKL MESLK
1 Food 0.95 -2.53 1.24 2.08 0.52 1.35*
(1.15) (1.83) (1.30) (1.51) (0.55) (0.38)
2 Textilesa 2.22* 0.10 2.43* 2.60* 0.41 0.60
(0.40) (1.13) (0.42) (1.27) (0.47) (0.52)
3 Wood 3.32 5.20 3.35 3.71 1.81 1.28
(3.63) (5.28) (3.69) (3.93) (1.11) (0.71)
4 Pulp, papera 1.21* 0.91* 1.36* 2.64* 2.33* 2.54*
(0.56) (0.40) (0.51) (1.18) (0.30) (1.11)
5 Chemicals 1.34 0.89 1.47 1.74 2.13* 1.30*
(1.46) (1.45) (1.46) (1.41) (0.35) (0.44)
6 Rubber, plasticsa 1.48 3.40 1.35 0.17 1.57* 0.75*
(1.86) (1.94) (1.84) (1.85) (0.32) (0.25)
7 Other non-metals 1.50 3.24* 1.40 1.34 3.50* 2.13*
(0.83) (1.00) (1.02) (1.27) (0.46) (0.41)
8 Metals 0.96 2.64* 0.90 1.55 2.41* 2.03*
(1.70) (1.11) (1.73) (1.06) (0.18) (0.18)
9 Machinerya 0.32 3.44 0.27 1.20 2.19* 2.07*
(2.88) (3.53) (2.93) (3.86) (0.20) (0.42)
10 Electrical equipm. 0.74 -3.05 0.90 2.73* 1.66* 2.28*
(1.47) (2.38) (1.49) (1.35) (0.22) (0.35)
11 Transport equipm.a 0.21 -0.05 0.07 -1.65 1.00 0.55
(3.53) (3.31) (3.59) (3.91) (0.72) (1.11)
Substitutes or Complements:
Substitutesb 11 (2) 8 (3) 11 (2) 10 (3) 11 (7) 11 (8)
Complementsb 0 (0) 3 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Notes: Swiss sectoral data. Asymptotic standard errors derived with the delta method. ∗ Indicates
significance at the 5% level. a Specification contains employment as a control variable. b Number of
significant estimates in parentheses.
4.2 Estimates from Pooled OECD Data
The large standard errors found above make a clear assessment of the the
degree of factor substitutability in Switzerland difficult. To obtain more precise
estimates, we complement the Swiss data with data from further high-income
OECD countries and pool these data in the regression. This specification again
yields sectoral-specific substitution elasticities but it does imply equality of the
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substitution patterns across countries. We use EU KLEMS data for Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and
Sweden, i.e., high-income OECD countries with economic attributes similar to
Switzerland.
Table 6: Own-price elasticities, pooled across OECD countries
Industry CPELL CPEKK CPEEE
1 Food -0.50* -0.57* -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.12)
2 Textilesa -0.40* -1.35* 0.16
(0.04) (0.19) (0.14)
3 Wooda -0.49* -0.41* -0.11
(0.06) (0.15) (0.18)
4 Pulp, paper -0.37* -0.64* -0.63*
(0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
5 Chemicals -0.65* -0.41* -0.87*
(0.08) (0.06) (0.14)
6 Rubber, plasticsa -0.40* -0.60* -0.25
(0.05) (0.11) (0.14)
7 Other non-metals -0.50* -0.90* -0.72*
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08)
8 Metals -0.28* -0.49* -0.48*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
9 Machinery -0.36* -0.51* -0.73*
(0.06) (0.10) (0.14)
10 Electrical equipm. -0.63* -0.80* -1.94*
(0.07) (0.13) (0.15)
11 Transport equipm. -0.62* -0.98* -0.65*
(0.11) (0.19) (0.14)
Concavity Test:
Negativeb 11 (11) 11 (11) 10 (7)
Positiveb 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0)
Notes: Pooled estimates with country fixed effects using data from Switzer-
land and 9 OECD countries. Asymptotic standard errors derived with the
delta method. ∗ Indicates significance at the 5% level. a Specification
contains employment. b Number of significant estimates in parentheses.
Table 6 displays the resulting own-price elasticities. Note that standard
errors are substantially smaller and most of the estimates are significantly
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smaller than zero. Generally, estimates of the pooled specification are similar
in magnitude as the Swiss estimates, except in some cases, where the Swiss
elasticities exhibit mostly high standard errors and insignificant results. All
but three own-price elasticities in the pooled specification lie in the range
between 0 and -1. All own-price elasticities are smaller than zero, indicating
that concavity conditions are well met. Figure 4 in the Appendix depicts point
estimates as well as confidence intervals graphically.
Table 7: Cross-price elasticities, pooled across OECD countries
Industry CPELE CPEEL CPEKE CPEEK CPEKL CPELK
1 Food 0.03* 0.39* -0.04* -0.99* 0.11* 0.18*
(0.01) (0.20) (0.01) (0.22) (0.03) (0.05)
2 Textilesa 0.03* 0.54* -0.11* -1.10* 0.44* 0.22*
(0.01) (0.19) (0.03) (0.26) (0.09) (0.04)
3 Wooda 0.04* 0.74* -0.11* -1.74* 0.41* 0.30*
(0.01) (0.31) (0.03) (0.42) (0.08) (0.06)
4 Pulp, paper 0.00 0.03 0.03* 0.28* 0.10* 0.10*
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05)
5 Chemicals -0.12* -0.76* 0.06* 0.93* 0.15* 0.38*
(0.03) (0.18) (0.02) (0.26) (0.03) (0.08)
6 Rubber, plasticsa 0.06* 0.71* -0.13* -1.45* 0.11* 0.10*
(0.02) (0.20) (0.03) (0.32) (0.06) (0.05)
7 Other non-metals 0.14* 0.66* 0.04 0.21 0.38* 0.46*
(0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (0.05)
8 Metals -0.04* -0.35* 0.03 0.26 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.13) (0.02) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05)
9 Machinery -0.05* -1.79* 0.04* 1.24* 0.29* 0.24*
(0.01) (0.24) (0.01) (0.28) (0.06) (0.05)
10 Electrical equipm. 0.01 0.12 0.15* 3.65* 0.15* 0.17*
(0.01) (0.26) (0.02) (0.42) (0.07) (0.08)
11 Transport equipm. 0.05* 0.83* -0.05* -0.95* -0.25* -0.29*
(0.01) (0.23) (0.02) (0.31) (0.10) (0.12)
Substitutes or Complements:
Substitutesb 8 (6) 8 (6) 6 (4) 6 (4) 10 (9) 10 (9)
Complementsb 3 (3) 3 (3) 5 (5) 5 (5) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Notes: Pooled estimates with country fixed effects using data from Switzerland and 9 OECD countries.
Asymptotic standard errors derived with the delta method. ∗ Indicates significance at the 5% level. a
Specification contains employment. b Number of significant estimates in parentheses.
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Table 7 displays the corresponding CPE. Compared to the Swiss estimates,
the elasticities are often of smaller magnitude. As in the Swiss case, evidence
on the substitutability is strong in the case of capital and labor. However,
it is mixed in the case of labor and energy as well as capital and energy.
More than 80% of all estimates are found to be significantly different from
zero. Figure 5 in the Appendix depicts point estimates as well as confidence
intervals graphically.
Table 8 displays the corresponding MES. It is found that all factors are
estimated to be mainly MES substitutes, as is the case for Swiss manufac-
turing. Again, more than 80% of all estimates are found to be significantly
different from zero. Figure 6 in the Appendix depicts point estimates as well
as confidence intervals graphically.
To summarize, we find that all inputs tend to be MES substitutes using
Swiss and pooled OECD data. Additionally, while labor and capital are pre-
dominantly CPE substitutes, labor and energy as well as capital and energy
are found to be CPE complements in a number of cases under both specifica-
tions. Besides the expected difference in the accuracy of the estimates thanks
to the larger sample size, the more moderate magnitude of the elasticities of
the pooled specification is a further noteworthy observation. It may be due to
the lesser importance of outliers as a result of the larger sample size or due to
an “averaging-out” effect in our country sample.
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Table 8: Morishima elasticities, pooled across OECD countries
Industry MESLE MESEL MESKE MESEK MESKL MESLK
1 Food 0.04 0.89* -0.03 -0.42 0.61* 0.75*
(0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.23) (0.06) (0.08)
2 Textilesa -0.13 0.94* -0.27 0.25 0.84* 1.56*
(0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.32) (0.10) (0.19)
3 Wooda 0.14 1.23* -0.00 -1.33* 0.90* 0.71*
(0.18) (0.32) (0.18) (0.45) (0.11) (0.16)
4 Pulp, paper 0.63* 0.40* 0.66* 0.92* 0.47* 0.74*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.10)
5 Chemicals 0.75* -0.11 0.92* 1.33* 0.80* 0.79*
(0.15) (0.20) (0.14) (0.27) (0.08) (0.10)
6 Rubber, plasticsa 0.31* 1.11* 0.12 -0.85* 0.52* 0.71*
(0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.34) (0.08) (0.13)
7 Other non-metals 0.87* 1.16* 0.76* 1.11* 0.88* 1.36*
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.16) (0.07) (0.10)
8 Metals 0.44* -0.07 0.51* 0.75* 0.30* 0.51*
(0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08)
9 Machinery 0.68* -1.43* 0.78* 1.75* 0.65* 0.75*
(0.14) (0.25) (0.14) (0.30) (0.08) (0.11)
10 Electrical equipm. 1.94* 0.75* 2.08* 4.45* 0.78* 0.98*
(0.15) (0.27) (0.15) (0.44) (0.10) (0.16)
11 Transport equipm. 0.70* 1.45* 0.61* 0.02 0.37* 0.68*
(0.14) (0.26) (0.14) (0.36) (0.15) (0.23)
Substitutes or Complements:
Substitutesb 10 (8) 8 (8) 8 (7) 8 (6) 11 (11) 11 (11)
Complementsb 1 (0) 3 (1) 3 (0) 3 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Notes: Pooled estimates with country fixed effects using data from Switzerland and 9 OECD countries.
Asymptotic standard errors derived with the delta method. ∗ Indicates significance at the 5% level. a
Specification contains employment. b Number of significant estimates in parentheses.
5 Discussion and Policy Relevance
We first compare our estimation results to findings from the existing literature
in Section 5.1, emphasizing the complementarity versus substitutability de-
bate. In Section 5.2, we assess how energy price increases affect the input mix
of manufacturing industries using our estimation results. Finally, in Section
5.3 we provide policy implications of our results.
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5.1 A Comparison with the Existing Literature
Table 9 lists a selection of recent contributions that utilize the translog specifi-
cation to estimate elasticities of substitution.11 Some of these studies estimate
elasticities of aggregate manufacturing while others compute industry-specific
elasticities. Three of the contributions use detailed firm-level data. Columns
two to eight of the table summarize further characteristics of the estimation
approach and the data employed. The last column reveals the resulting range
Table 9: Comparison of assumptions and results of translog studies
Study Struct. Country Industries Period Estimat. Technology Elasticities Estimates
M-Ma KLEM CHE 11 1997-08 SURE factor-specific CPE, MES -5.2 to 5.9
M-Ma KLEM 9 C. 11 1995-05 SURE factor-specific CPE, MES -1.9 to 4.4
A-Bb KLE DEN micro pan. 1993-97 SURE factor-specific CPE -1.5 to 2.6
Cc KLE GRE aggregate 1970-90 IZEF∗ Hicks-neutral CPE -1.3 to 1.0
D-Gd KLEM CAN 2 (4-digit) 1961-03 SURE factor-specific CPE, MES -0.4 to 0.8
K-Te KLE USA 3 2007 SURE Hicks-neutral CPE, MES -12.3 to 9.6
M-Vf KLE 3 C. aggregate 1980-96 SURE Hicks-neutral AES, CPE -0.4 to 0.4
N-Sg KLEM USA micro data 1991 IZ3SLS∗∗ factor-specific CPE, MES -3.8 to 3.2
T-Th KLE(M) FIN micro data 2000-09 SURE factor-specific AES, CPE -1.4 to 1.6
W-Oi KLE GER aggregate 1976-94 I3SE factor-specific CPE, MES -1.3 to 1.6
Yj KLE SWE 9 (2-digit) 1965-89 SURE factor-specific AES, CPE -0.5 to 1.0
Notes: Comparison of studies that estimate elasticities from a translog specification. ∗ Nonlinear iterative
Zellner estimation. ∗∗ Iterative Zellner three stage least squares. a We report economic elasticities for 11
sectoral aggregates for Switzerland. b We pool data over 9 OECD countries. c Arnberg and Bjorner (2007)
distinguish between electricity and other energy; Cross-section estimates as well as fixed-effects estimates;
Additionally they apply a linear logit specification. d Christopoulos (2000) distinguishes between crude
oil, electricity and diesel (energy sources nested); estimates long-run elasticities from a dynamic structure;
elasticities containing diesel are larger than the others. e Dissou and Ghazal (2010) Additionally to the
translog cost function they apply a Symmetric Generalized McFadden (SGM) cost function. f Krishnapillai
and Thompson (2012) use electricity instead of energy; aggregate 4-digit industries to three categories. g
Medina and Vega-Cervera (2001) estimate elasticities of manufacturing for Italy, Portugal and Spain. h
Nguyen and Streitwieser (1999) use a cross-section data set; estimate elasticities for small plants and large
plants. i Tamminen and Tuomaala (2012) present own-price elasticities and MES for 71 sectors; factor
material is nested; differentiate between electricity and other energy; include the production factor outside
services. j Welsch and Ochsen (2005) show only elasticities containing the factor energy; differentiate
between low-skilled and high-skilled labor; consider technological change and trade orientation. k Yi
(2000) distinguishes between electricity and fuels; estimates a dynamic translog (TL) version and a general
Leontief (GL) version.
11For a comparison of elasticity results of earlier studies we refer to Apostolakis (1990) and
Koetse et al. (2008).
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of the elasticity estimates’ magnitude. We observe that the size of our esti-
mates are largely in line with other contributions that provide industry-specific
elasticities while estimates of aggregate manufacturing elasticities are usually
of lower magnitude.
Regarding the substitutability versus complementarity debate, we first ob-
serve that the production factors capital and labor are predominantly CPE
substitutes and MES substitutes using the Swiss as well as the OECD sam-
ple. This is in line with the existing literature which usually predicts substi-
tutability between these two factors for manufacturing industries as well as for
aggregate manufacturing.12
Second, energy and labor are also usually estimated to be CPE substitutes
and MES substitutes at the aggregate level in the existing literature. How-
ever, empirical findings are less clear on an industry-specific level, indicating
complementarity in a number of cases. Using Swiss data, we find that ev-
idence on CPE substitutability is mixed while labor and energy are clearly
MES substitutes. Using the OECD sample, there is slightly more evidence
for the substitutability of these factors: In about two thirds of the industries,
labor and energy are CPE substitutes while in all but one industries, these
factors are MES substitutes.
Third, existing empirical evidence is especially mixed on the question of
whether capital and energy are substitutes or complements. A comparison of
empirical papers by Apostolakis (1990) shows that capital and energy tend to
be complements in studies using time-series data, while in cross-section and
pooled time-series studies capital and energy are estimated as being substi-
tutes. Further differences in the modeling approach (KLEM vs. KLE), the
level of sector aggregation, or the region and time period covered also influ-
ence the estimation results as is emphasized by Koetse et al. (2008). Using
our OECD estimates, we find that capital and energy are CPE substitutes in
about half and MES substitutes in about two thirds of the industries. Using
Swiss data only and relying on the point estimates, the two factors are CPE
substitutes in eight industries and complements in the remaining three and
MES substitutes in all but one industry. The last result is in line with in-
12Capital and labor may also be complements in a few particular industries, as shown, for
instance, in Dissou and Ghazal (2010).
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sights from Thompson and Taylor (1995) who emphasize that using the MES,
empirical evidence clearly suggests substitutability between those two factors.
5.2 Energy Price Increases and the Input Mix
The economic substitution elasticities estimated above describe the cost min-
imizing behavior of firms upon price changes holding output constant and
allowing for the adjustment of all factor inputs simultaneously. In such a set-
ting, complementarity of certain input factors is only possible in a production
function environment with three or more production factors. In other words,
if there exists complementarity between two factors and the price of one of
them increases, then the remaining factors have to offset the reduction in the
use of the first two factors to hold output constant.
There are two take-aways from these clarifications: First, all relevant pro-
duction factors must be included into the estimation, since the exclusion of
factors that are not homothetically separable in prices results in biased elas-
ticity estimates (Jorgenson, 1986). Second, when interpreting the adjustment
behavior of firms using these elasticities, it is mandatory to consider all factor
adjustments simultaneously, since they are largely influenced by each other.
In our view, this is often neglected in the existing literature, that mostly con-
centrates on the interplay between two selected factors (usually energy and
capital). We therefore provide an interpretation of our estimates considering
all factor adjustments in the following. In the light of recent developments
especially in Switzerland but also in other OECD economies, we focus in our
analysis on the implications of energy price increases for the input mix of
manufacturing industries.
Table 10 displays the industry-specific effects of a relative energy price in-
crease on the factor expenses and on total production costs using the pooled
OECD data.13 We first note that within the translog framework, total pro-
duction costs adjustments are directly proportional to the factor share of the
factor experiencing the price change: The last column indicates, for example,
that a 1% increase of the energy price yields a total cost increase of 0.018%
given the sector’s initial (average) cost of 1.8% (see to Table 2).
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Table 10: Effects of an energy price increase on factor expenses
Industry ∆pExE ∆pLxL ∆pKxK ∆pMxM ∆TC
1 Food 0.990 0.028 -0.042 0.015 0.018
2 Textiles 1.162 0.027 -0.112 0.015 0.020
3 Wood 0.891 0.035 -0.113 0.036 0.028
4 Pulp, paper 0.365 0.003 0.029 0.025 0.026
5 Chemicals 0.125 -0.116 0.056 0.036 0.052
6 Rubber, plastics 0.744 0.057 -0.130 0.045 0.031
7 Other non-metals 0.270 0.144 0.038 -0.025 0.061
8 Metals 0.514 -0.044 0.033 0.040 0.036
9 Machinery 0.258 -0.054 0.045 0.022 0.012
10 Electrical equipm. -0.958 0.005 0.145 -0.045 0.011
11 Transport equipm. 0.340 0.049 -0.048 0.013 0.011
Weighted avg. 0.184 -0.013 0.030 0.011 0.025
No. positive/negative 10/1 8/3 6/5 9/2 11/0
Notes: Estimation results from the pooled OECD sample; Values denote percentage changes
(%); sE is the share of energy expenses; ∆pixi is the relative change of input i’s expenses; ∆
TC is the relative change of total production costs.
More interesting are hence the effects on the expenses of the various input
factors displayed in the preceding four columns. On average, energy expenses
increase 0.18% upon an energy price rise of 1.00% due to the inelastic nature of
the own-price elasticities in all but one industry using the OECD data. Mainly
driven by the large negative effect in the chemical industry, labor expenses
decrease by 0.01%, implying that labor and energy are CPE complements on
average. In contrast, capital and material expenses increase by 0.03% and
0.01% upon an energy price rise, indicating substitutability versus energy on
average. Since factor prices of labor, material and capital are assumed to be
constant, changes in the expenses of these factors are equivalent to changes in
the factor use. Hence, in some industries like the chemical industry, the change
in the use of input factors can be quite substantial with a 0.12% decrease of
labor use, a 0.06% increase of capital use and a 0.04% increase of material use
upon a 1.00% increase in the energy price despite the limited energy intensity of
production. As the last row of the table shows, substantial differences between
sectors are observable.
13We want to emphasize that this is a partial equilibrium analysis, which does neither take
into account general equilibrium effects on prices of other inputs nor demand side effects.
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In Table 13 in the Appendix, the same results are shown using Swiss data
only. Energy expenses decrease on average due to the elastic point estimates
of the energy own-price elasticities. However, this result must be put into
perspective since standard errors are large and it is not possible to show that
elasticities are indeed significantly smaller than -1. Reaction of the other factor
expenses are on average similar to results of the OECD sample; also observing
reductions in labor expenses and increases in capital and material use.
Table 11 displays the effects of an energy price increase on the ratios of the
physical use (left panel) as well as the costs (rights panel) of energy relative
to the other factors, hence using the MES as determinants. The first three
columns indicate that the ratio of physical energy use relative to the use of
the three other factors of production decreases on average, where the decrease
is strongest for the energy-capital ratio. The last three columns of the table
imply that despite the relative decrease in the employed quantity of energy,
energy cost ratios rise on average relative to all other input factors, an outcome
due to the inelastic nature of the own-price elasticities of the factor energy.
Table 11: Effects of an energy price increase on factor use and cost ratios
Use ratio of Energy to: Cost ratio of Energy to:
Industry Labor Capital Material Labor Capital Material
1 Food -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.96 1.03 0.97
2 Textiles 0.13 0.27 0.15 1.13 1.27 1.15
3 Wood -0.14 0.00 -0.14 0.86 1.00 0.86
4 Pulp, paper -0.63 -0.66 -0.65 0.37 0.34 0.35
5 Chemicals -0.75 -0.92 -0.90 0.25 0.08 0.10
6 Rubber, plastics -0.31 -0.12 -0.30 0.69 0.88 0.70
7 Other non-metals -0.87 -0.76 -0.70 0.13 0.24 0.30
8 Metals -0.44 -0.51 -0.52 0.56 0.49 0.48
9 Machinery -0.68 -0.78 -0.76 0.32 0.22 0.24
10 Electrical equipm. -1.94 -2.08 -1.89 -0.94 -1.08 -0.89
11 Transport equipm. -0.70 -0.61 -0.67 0.30 0.39 0.33
Weighted avg. -0.80 -0.84 -0.82 0.20 0.16 0.18
No. positive/negative 1/10 3/10 1/10 10/1 10/1 10/1
Notes: Estimation results from the pooled OECD sample; Values denote percentage changes (%); values of
column two to four are −MESiE and values of column five to seven are 1−MESiE , for i = L,K,M .
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The increase is strongest regarding labor costs, a follow-up of the CPE
complementarity between energy and labor. Tables 10 and 11, hence, nicely
demonstrate the relationship between MES and CPE while still emphasizing
the different interpretation of these measures.
In Table 14 in the Appendix, we show analogous results using Swiss data.
Again, the general patterns are similar to the OECD sample: Ratios of physical
energy use decrease relative to the other input factors, the strongest effect being
on the energy-capital use ratio. In contrast to the OECD sample, however,
cost ratios of energy decrease, a consequence of the elastic but insignificant
own-price elasticities of energy using the Swiss data set. In analogy to the
OECD sample, the reduction of the energy-labor cost ratio is weakest owing
to the CPE complementarity of these factors.
5.3 Policy Implications
The implementation of policies to mitigate climate change as well as to achieve
the nuclear phaseout in Switzerland will most likely change absolute and rel-
ative prices of different energy sources as energy prices are expected to rise
substantially.14 These changes will alter the factor content of industrial pro-
duction and increase production costs in Switzerland. If these policies are im-
plemented unilaterally, the policy induced price changes only affect the Swiss
economy. Manufacturing industries are, however, often exposed to interna-
tional competition, which leads to low pass-through possibilities of changes
in production costs. Furthermore, unilateral implementation of mitigation or
abatement policies involve counterproductive effects such as carbon leakage.15
In summary, unilateral energy policies are prone to have unwanted reverse
effects on the Swiss but also the world economy.
14For example, the IEA (2012) notes that several aspects of Switzerland’s energy policy suggest
an increased likelihood of higher energy prices: GHG emission reduction targets, policies
aimed at the nuclear phaseout, investments in electricity grids and capacity, and convergence
with price levels in surrounding countries. Furthermore, scenarios of the Swiss government
expect substantial price increases of more than 50% for most energy carriers, see Swiss
Federal Office of Energy (2011).
15Carbon leakage has been investigated by e.g., Felder and Rutherford (1993) and Juergens
et al. (2013).
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For these reasons, it is well recognized that climate and energy policies are
best implemented in a multilateral framework to mitigate detrimental effects
on the environment and, at the same time, prevent negative repercussions
on the domestic (energy-intensive) production. Table 12 shows the average
energy shares of Swiss industries along with an openness indicator and the
revenue share in total Swiss manufacturing as a static measure for the indus-
tries’ importance. Using the indicators in the first two columns, the textile, the
chemical and the metal industry seem to be most exposed by a unilateral pol-
icy, the latter two industries accounting for two thirds of Swiss manufacturing
revenues.
Table 12: Exposure of Swiss manufacturing industries
Industry Energy share Openness Revenue share
1 Food 1.4% 45% 10.1%
2 Textiles 1.8% 345% 1.3%
3 Wood 1.3% 30% 3.1%
4 Pulp, paper 3.5% 70% 5.4%
5 Chemicals 1.5% 157% 22.9%
6 Rubber, plastics 1.4% 118% 3.0%
7 Other non-metals 4.5% 72% 2.2%
8 Metals 2.3% 123% 10.0%
9 Machinery 0.6% 133% 14.2%
10 Electrical equipm. 0.8% 109% 25.1%
11 Transport equipm. 1.4% 323% 2.7%
Weighted avg. (sum) 1.4% 122% (100%)
Notes: The table displays average energy shares from 1997 to 2008. Openness is defined as
the value of imports and exports relative to the total production value. The revenue shares
are relative to aggregate manufacturing.
In this context, our analysis shows that the change of the input mix can
be quite substantial in selected industries upon an energy price increase, even
in the short run and given that production remains at a constant level: On
average, energy and labor inputs will decrease relative to capital and mate-
rial inputs upon energy price increases. The results seem intuitive as energy
savings may result from investments into new technologies but also from out-
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sourcing the production of energy-intensive intermediates. Results also indi-
cate the possibility that the labor force is partially displaced even at constant
production levels. Given that energy prices are expected to increase by 50%
or more in the long-run and the possibility of unwanted negative repercussions
due to unilateral implementation, effects could be expected to be more severe
although the short-run elasticities estimated in our contribution cannot answer
such questions conclusively.
Nonetheless, our results in combination with the high exposure to inter-
national competition of certain industries give evidence to the notion that
unilateral climate and energy policies are therefore accompanied by a great
deal of uncertainty and substantial risks. It is not by chance that the IEA rec-
ommends Switzerland to align its energy policies with its major trade partners
(IEA, 2012): “[Switzerland should] pursue closer integration with European
energy markets and closest possible alignment of its energy policies with those
of the European Union”. If extensive climate and energy policies are adapted
without international coordination, our result that reveals substantial changes
in the input mix even in the short run hint at the possibility that reverse ef-
fects that are clearly beyond the scope of our analysis may be triggered. For
example, alterations of factor prices of relatively immobile factors like labor, a
certain degree of deindustrialization or even negative spill-overs on the environ-
ment. It remains to note that alternatives to multilateral commitment exist,
e.g. supplementary measures such as border tax adjustments or tax exempts
for energy intensive industries.16 Both possibilities have inherent drawbacks.
While the border tax adjustments are very difficult to implement from a tech-
nical point of view, tax exempts undermine the original purpose of energy
policy measures.
6 Concluding Remarks
We estimate sectoral substitution elasticities for manufacturing industries in
Switzerland and additionally present such elasticities from a sample of high-
income OECD countries with economic attributes similar to Switzerland. In
16See for instance, Kuik and Hofkes (2010) and van Asselt and Brewer (2010) on border tax
adjustments.
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our analysis, we illustrate how energy price increases affect the input mix of
manufacturing industries in the short run. We consider the relative change of
factor expenses and factor ratios as well as the increase of total production
costs upon an increase in relative energy prices. Finally, we discuss poten-
tial challenges that have to be considered when implementing future policy
measures that increase relative energy prices.
Our empirical results suggest that a relative price increase of energy sub-
stantially affects the input mix of manufacturing firms in the short run. We
show that the decrease in the use of energy is in many industries compen-
sated by increasing expenses on labor, capital and material inputs. However,
weighting industries according to their size results in a manufacturing-wide de-
crease of labor expenses upon an energy price increase, implying energy-labor
complementarity. Our results give important insights about the flexibility of
production in the short run and complement results of computational general
equilibrium models that rather place emphasis on the middle- and long-run
impact of policy measures.
It remains to emphasize that in the long run, even rigid factors can be
adjusted as firms can adapt new technologies or innovate production. Better
knowledge of these adjustment processes are of great interest for policy makers
in the field of energy and environmental economics. Effects of technological
innovations and the adaptation of new technologies are thus important topics
of future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variances of the Elasticities
We derive the standard errors of the elasticities by using the Delta method
(see e.g., Greene (2000)). The variance of the CPE is:
var(CPEij) =
( 1
si
)2
var(βˆij). (5)
The expression determining the variance of own-price elasticities can be derived
analogously and is omitted here. The variance of the MES is given by
var(MESij) = var(CPEij) + var(CPEjj)− 2cov(CPEij,CPEjj) (6)
=
( 1
si
)2
var(βˆij) +
(
1
sj
)2
var(βˆjj)− 2
(
1
sisj
)
cov(βˆij, βˆjj).
A.2 Data
Data for the OECD countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden) is taken from the EU
KLEMS database.17 This database provides sectoral data on prices and quan-
tities of different input and output variables for about 30 countries. Data
coverage varies substantially across countries, and we selected the countries
with comparable coverage to the Swiss data set (see below). We use data from
1995 to 2005 with the exception of France (1998 to 2005) and Great Britain
(1996 to 2005). A description of this database is presented in Timmer et al.
(2007) and O’Mahony and Timmer (2009).
Most data used to estimate the Swiss elasticities has been assembled dur-
ing a precursory project, see Mohler and Müller (2011). We use data from
1997 to 2008 for the analysis of Swiss manufacturing industries. We use sales
by industry as surveyed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) in the
Produktions- und Wertschöpfungsstatistik as our output variable. Material
and labor expenditures stem from the same survey. Energy expenditures are
calculated by using the survey EVID from the Swiss Federal Office of Energy
17The EU KLEMS database is readily available for download at http://www.euklems.net.
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(SFOE), which comprises the physical quantities of different energy sources
used by manufacturing industries. Unfortunately, this data set is not avail-
able at the 2-digit NOGA level. Hence, we aggregate the relevant NOGA
2-digit industries into 11 manufacturing industries as laid out in Table 1. We
then calculate the energy expenditures of each industry by using energy prices
published by the IEA and the SFOE and the physical quantities from the
EVID database. Capital expenditures are calculated as a residual by taking
the difference of sales, material, labor and energy expenditures. As for the
price indices used in the analysis, we employ output and material price indices
available from the OECD. We use a wage index published by the SFSO. Sec-
toral energy price indices are calculated by using the above-mentioned data
on physical energy use and the energy prices using a Laspeyres price index
approach. Capital price indices are not available for different manufacturing
industries in Switzerland. We use an investment/capital goods import price
index published by the Swiss Federal Customs Administration (EZV) to proxy
capital price changes, as we are mainly interested in the price evolution of
physical capital.
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A.3 Energy Price Effects, Swiss Sample
Table 13: Effects of an energy price increase on factor expenses, Switzerland
Industry ∆pExE ∆pLxL ∆pKxK ∆pMxM ∆TC
1 Food -0.157 -0.200 0.098 0.053 0.014
2 Textiles -1.253 -0.009 0.198 0.011 0.018
3 Wood -2.210 0.144 0.168 -0.091 0.013
4 Pulp, paper -0.212 0.006 0.164 -0.003 0.034
5 Chemicals -0.436 -0.084 0.046 0.041 0.015
6 Rubber, plastics -0.380 0.113 -0.013 -0.021 0.014
7 Other non-metals -0.306 0.207 0.105 -0.075 0.044
8 Metals 0.120 0.090 0.025 -0.040 0.023
9 Machinery 0.724 0.047 -0.003 -0.022 0.006
10 Electrical equipm. 0.129 -0.117 0.035 0.060 0.008
11 Transport equipm. 0.707 -0.083 -0.220 0.122 0.014
Weighted avg. -0.064 -0.043 0.044 0.021 0.014
No. positive/negative 4/7 6/5 8/3 5/6 11/0
Notes: Estimation results from the Swiss sample; Values denote percentage changes (%); sE is
the share of energy expenses; ∆pixi is the relative change of input i’s expenses; ∆ TC is the
relative change of total production costs.
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Table 14: Effects of an energy price increase on factor use and cost ratios,
Switzerland
Use ratio of Energy to: Cost ratio of Energy to:
Industry Labor Capital Material Labor Capital Material
1 Food -0.95 -1.24 -1.20 0.05 -0.24 -0.20
2 Textiles -2.22 -2.43 -2.24 -1.22 -1.43 -1.24
3 Wood -3.32 -3.35 -3.09 -2.32 -2.35 -2.09
4 Pulp, paper -1.21 -1.36 -1.20 -0.21 -0.36 -0.20
5 Chemicals -1.34 -1.47 -1.46 -0.34 -0.47 -0.46
6 Rubber, plastics -1.48 -1.35 -1.35 -0.48 -0.35 -0.35
7 Other non-metals -1.50 -1.40 -1.22 -0.50 -0.40 -0.22
8 Metals -0.96 -0.90 -0.83 0.04 0.10 0.17
9 Machinery -0.32 -0.27 -0.25 0.68 0.73 0.75
10 Electrical equipm. -0.74 -0.90 -0.92 0.26 0.10 0.08
11 Transport equipm. -0.21 -0.07 -0.41 0.79 0.93 0.59
Weighted avg. -1.01 -1.10 -1.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07
No. positive/negative 0/11 0/11 0/11 5/6 4/7 4/7
Notes: Estimation results from the Swiss sample; Values denote percentage changes (%); values of column
two to four are −MESiE and values of column five to seven are 1−MESiE , for i = L,K,M .
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A.4 Key Estimation Statistics
Table 15: Key statistics, Swiss sample
Industry Equation Observations RMSE R-squared p-value
1 Capital 11 0.004 0.46 0.005
Labor 11 0.002 0.85 0.000
Energy 11 0.001 0.29 0.631
2 Capital 11 0.009 0.18 0.391
Labor 11 0.006 0.73 0.000
Energy 11 0.001 0.71 0.077
3 Capital 11 0.008 0.45 0.190
Labor 11 0.014 0.63 0.000
Energy 11 0.000 0.79 0.863
4 Capital 11 0.005 0.65 0.000
Labor 11 0.002 0.98 0.000
Energy 11 0.000 0.89 0.000
5 Capital 11 0.008 0.92 0.000
Labor 11 0.003 0.93 0.000
Energy 11 0.000 0.96 0.000
6 Capital 11 0.004 0.35 0.000
Labor 11 0.003 0.96 0.000
Energy 11 0.001 0.40 0.070
7 Capital 11 0.007 0.75 0.000
Labor 11 0.005 0.94 0.000
Energy 11 0.002 0.67 0.022
8 Capital 11 0.004 0.79 0.000
Labor 11 0.004 0.95 0.000
Energy 11 0.001 0.93 0.000
9 Capital 11 0.006 0.59 0.000
Labor 11 0.002 0.99 0.000
Energy 11 0.000 0.43 0.477
10 Capital 11 0.007 0.88 0.000
Labor 11 0.001 1.00 0.000
Energy 11 0.000 0.96 0.000
11 Capital 11 0.010 0.41 0.142
Labor 11 0.008 0.89 0.000
Energy 11 0.001 0.61 0.501
Notes: For each sector we estimated a SUR consisting of three share equations. We list
the number of observations, the root mean square error, the r-squared and the p-value for
each equation.
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Table 16: Key statistics, pooled OECD sample
Industries Equation Observations RMSE R-squared p-value
1 Capital 87 0.010 0.94 0.000
Labor 87 0.004 0.98 0.000
Energy 87 0.002 0.82 0.000
2 Capital 87 0.014 0.93 0.000
Labor 87 0.010 0.96 0.000
Energy 87 0.002 0.82 0.000
3 Capital 87 0.018 0.88 0.000
Labor 87 0.013 0.94 0.000
Energy 87 0.004 0.96 0.000
4 Capital 87 0.017 0.90 0.000
Labor 87 0.011 0.96 0.000
Energy 87 0.002 0.93 0.000
5 Capital 87 0.015 0.95 0.000
Labor 87 0.008 0.96 0.000
Energy 87 0.007 0.94 0.000
6 Capital 87 0.016 0.86 0.000
Labor 87 0.010 0.92 0.000
Energy 87 0.004 0.96 0.000
7 Capital 87 0.013 0.95 0.000
Labor 87 0.008 0.95 0.000
Energy 87 0.006 0.78 0.000
8 Capital 87 0.011 0.94 0.000
Labor 87 0.010 0.97 0.000
Energy 87 0.006 0.78 0.000
9 Capital 87 0.014 0.92 0.000
Labor 87 0.010 0.93 0.000
Energy 87 0.002 0.89 0.000
10 Capital 87 0.022 0.91 0.000
Labor 87 0.010 0.93 0.000
Energy 87 0.002 0.72 0.000
11 Capital 87 0.013 0.93 0.000
Labor 87 0.010 0.97 0.000
Energy 87 0.001 0.86 0.000
Notes: Data pooled across countries including country fixed effects. For each sector we
estimated a SUR consisting of three share equations. We list the number of observations,
the root mean square error, the r-squared and the p-value for each equation.
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A.5 Estimation Results: Switzerland
Figure 1: Own-price elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries in Switzerland. We use the translog cost function as functional form.
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Figure 2: Cross-price elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries in Switzerland. We use the translog cost function as functional form.
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Figure 2: Cross-price elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries (cont.)
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries in Switzerland. We use the translog cost function as functional form.
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Figure 3: Morishima elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries in Switzerland. We use the translog cost function as functional form.
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Figure 3: Morishima elasticities, Swiss manufacturing industries (cont.)
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries in Switzerland. We use the translog cost function as functional form.
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A.6 Estimation Results: Pooled OECD Countries
Figure 4: Own-price elasticities, pooled across OECD countries
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries. Pooled estimates with fixed effects, translog cost function.
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Figure 5: Cross-price elasticities, pooled across OECD countries
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries. Pooled estimates with fixed effects, translog cost function.
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Figure 5: Cross-price elasticities, pooled across OECD countries (cont.)
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries. Pooled estimates with fixed effects, translog cost function.
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Figure 6: Morishima elasticities, pooled across OECD countries
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries. Pooled estimates with fixed effects, translog cost function.
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Figure 6: Morishima elasticities, pooled across OECD countries (cont.)
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Notes: Figures display the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval of the elasticities for the 11
manufacturing industries. Pooled estimates with fixed effects, translog cost function.
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